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Throughout the process of writing this thesis, I have struggled with whether or not 
to use the term “gender abolition.” In one sense, the term itself initially piqued my 
interest in the topic. I remember the first time I heard of gender abolition, I had an 
immediate intuitive resistance. I thought it was another manifestation of the disconnect 
that exists between academia and society at large. However, my feelings quickly changed 
when the concept was explained to me in my sophomore year philosophy seminar. My 
incredulousness transformed to excitement when I realized gender abolition was actually 
simply the full realization of gender equality. I loved how provacative the term was, and 
my friends skeptical reactions when I would bring the topic up in conversation. Gender 
abolition was also an intellectual challenge, as I had minimal exposure to gender theory 
prior to college. Everything I was learning was new and made me confront issues I had 
never questioned before.  
Yet, as I began to get further along in my writing process, I again began to 
question the effectiveness of the term. I worried that abolition was too trendy of a term. It 
reminded me of the echo chamber of social media, particularly at a liberal arts school in 
California. I thought back to my initial feelings and conversations I had with others and 
started to fear that the term could distract from my argument. I worried people would 
either write off the topic immediately, or uncritically embrace it. As someone who loves 
argumentation,  I did not know which was worse, and upon reflection I realized I could 
not fault people for either of these positions. Abolition is a powerful word intimately 
 
 5 
connected with the struggle against slavery. Who wouldn’t want to be an abolitionist? At 
the same time, the term has deep legal connotations, so I understand why someone’s 
initial thought could be: and now they want to make being a man/woman illegal?!  
 Despite these reservations, I decided to embrace the term. I think there is a very 
profound duality and tension at the heart of gender abolition. In one way, it forcefully 
articulates the worthy and (seemingly) uncontroversial idea that men and women should 
be treated as equals. At the same time, the scope of abolition makes clear how deeply 
gender based injustice runs, and how hesitant we all are to truly accept what is morally 
required of us. Perhaps even more so than race, the inequalities between the genders is 
assumed to be a natural consequence of biology.  
 Overall, my thesis aims to demonstrate that the full realization of human 
advancement as understood from a Marxist perspective, as well as within the framework 
of Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom requires the abolition of gender. I argue that 
as long as gender endures, neither Sen nor Marx’s vision for the development of 
humanity has been achieved. I begin by offering my own operative definition for gender. 
This definition is not a normative definition laying out how I believe gender should 
function, but rather how gender does function within our patriarchal world. Chapter two 
focuses on the meaning of gender abolition. I question the legitimacy of the way we 
currently conceptualize biological sex, which I argue erases the existence of intersex 
people. I also consider the position of transgender people within my framework, and their 
relationship with gender abolition. The second section of this chapter draws heavily upon, 
and  offers abolitionist readings of Cheryl Harris’s Whiteness as Property Angela Davis’s 
Women and Capitalism.  
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 Having defined these two key concepts, I transition to my analysis of Marx and 
Sen’s theories. Looking first at Marx I argue that despite the fact that he never discusses 
the concept of gender explicitly, his call for the abolition of the division of labor found in 
The German Ideology is effectively an argument in support of the complete dismantling 
of gender. I also argue that the ideal of human emancipation articulated in On the Jewish 
Question necessitates gender abolition. I then shift to Sen’s Development as Freedom, 
which defines development as the removal of forms unfreedoms, one of which, I argue, is 
gender. I chose to focus on Marx and Sen because I think there is a significant 
juxtaposition between the two philosophers’ overall beliefs. Most obviously, Marx held 
that capitalism was the source of great degradation for the human race, while Sen 
believes capitalism has the ability to promote freedom. I believe this strengthens my 
argument because whether or not the reader has faith in capitalism, it is clear that gender 
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CHAPTER 1: My operative definition of Gender 
In furthering my argument for gender abolition, I will define gender as the 
societally and institutionally enforced construct that delegates duties, privileges, and 
expectations based on biological sex assigned at birth. The “morally arbitrary” 
characteristic of biological sex ascribes onto every individual a binary conception of what 
constitutes a proper life. Gender is taught and entrenched as children grow up, as failure 
to conform behaviors with gender-based expectations can have dramatic social, economic 
and legal ramifications. Fundamentally, gender offers to men much greater freedom in 
actualizing, defining, and pursuing their desires, while perpetuating women’s servility. 
Moreover, gender is also a major force in shaping the way we come to understand what 
we believe that we desire. Critically, the burdens associated with gender are not felt 
equally by all women and compound with other forms of vulnerability (race, class 
positions, disability) to create unique challenges.  
Here, it is important to point out that this is not intended to be a normative 
definition of gender. This is not what I believe gender should be, but what I believe 
gender is at present. My definition is not what I believe that gender can be in its best form 
- a recognition and identification with our internal and external selves. I intend for this 
definition to reflect the historical and cultural realities that find their root in the restrictive 
gender binary, not to replicate these unjust forces. If this definition seems uninclusive of 
transgender people, that is a reflection of the historical fact that gender in its traditional 
construction has not been inclusive of transgender people. It may seem counterintuitive 
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but in fact, the courage of transgender individuals to live life as their truest selves is one 
of the most revolutionary forces (through the erosion of the linkage between biological 
sex and gender presentation) furthering gender abolition.  
 As I see it, there are two main components of gender abolition - two different 
avenues through which we can dismantle the most restrictive elements of gender. By 
gender abolition, it is not meant that presenting in a particular way will be met with some 
type of sanctions because it is now against the law. Instead, abolition in this context 
refers to change that fundamentally alters the way in which gender functions. This can 
occur either through eroding the linkage between biological sex assigned at birth and 
gender, or by changing the relationships of dominance and subservience that charecterize 




Turning now to my definition of gender, I first want to focus on the delegation of 
“duties, privileges, and expectations.”  I do not aim to give a complete account of all the 
duties, privileges and expectations that come along with gender as presently constructed. 
Instead, I will highlight some of the aspects that have the most impact on individuals 
ability to achieve the life that they desire, while simultaneously respecting and affirming 
their human dignity. These three concepts, duties, privileges, and expectations, are all 
intimately connected. For example, the burden of women’s “duties” serve to perpetuate 
male “privilege.” This is seen in Karl Marx’s observation that, as with the division of 
labor generally, men are better able to attain material wealth by “disposing of the labor 
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power” of women within the household (German Ideology 159). In other words, the duty 
of domestic labor shouldered by women privileges men economically. Moreover, gender 
based assumption of “duty” and “privilege” both inextricably linked to the “expectations” 
of both parties. I choose to separate these terms not to suggest that they are different, but 
instead because each plays a specific role in my definition. Additionally, the phrase 
“delegates expectations, duties, rights, and privileges” aims to situate my definition in the 
context of the discourse of distributive justice. 
Focusing first on duty, one of the main areas of consensus across feminist thought 
is the recognition that gender places a disproportionate share of unpaid domestic labor on 
the shoulders of women to the benefit of the male breadwinner. This is one of the 
foundational assumptions of the traditionally gendered family. Plainly, gender delegates 
far greater domestic duties to women than to men. Susan Moller Okin, one of the greatest 
modern feminist thinkers, opens her book Justice, Gender and the Family, by attributing 
inequality between men and women to this particular aspect of gender. Moller Okin 
states, “Underlying and intertwined with [the inequalities between men and women] is 
the unequal distribution of the unpaid labor of the family (Okin 4).” This perspective is 
not limited to modern feminist thinkers. In The German Ideology, Karl Marx also 
contends that the division of labor found within the family is the basis for the division of 
labor more broadly, which he views as the root of all inequality (German Ideology 158, 
197). This will be explored in much greater depth in chapter 3. 
Critically, the justice of this unequal distribution of domestic duty has long been 
left unchallenged, even among esteemed contemporary philosophers like John Rawls. 
Okin argues that Rawls fails to sufficiently address how gender fits in his theory of 
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justice put forward in his seminal work A Theory of Justice. As Moller Okin points out, 
Rawls “specifically mentions the family as a just institution - not, however, to consider 
whether the family “in some form” is a just institution but to assume it (Okin 94).” This 
issue is compounded by the fact that the subjects of Rawls’ hypothetical “original 
position” are all “head of families (Okin 94).” Based on this critical omission, Okin holds 
that even if those in the original position adopted Rawls’ two principles, they would fail 
in creating entirely just institutions as the family is a major institution itself - one that 
Rawls regards as foundational to developing a sense of justice in all citizens (Okin 95-
97). 
Turning now to the delegation of privilege, it is important to recognize that 
definitionally, the term implies that some occupy a relatively superior position as 
compared to others. Thinking of gender in this way is useful for a couple of reasons. 
Firstly, conceiving of privilege as something that is distributed on the basis of gender 
makes explicit the power differential that exists between men and women in patriarchal 
society. Gender as I define it implies a power differential between men and women. If 
this does not exist, then gender no longer exists in its current form. For example, men 
generally hold more economic and political power than women. This power differential is 
largely based on the social roles that men occupy as a result of their privileged position 
within the traditionally gendered family. If this power differential ceased to exist, it 
would require that gender no longer assigned social roles that leave women with 
relatively weaker agency as compared to men. More concretely, this means that if we 
were to eliminate gender privilege, we would likely have to deconstruct the delegated 
social roles that define gender itself. 
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 At the same time, this way of conceptualizing gender also makes clear the 
injustice that necessarily exists within gender. No one can question that men and women 
are equally deserving of dignity by virtue of our shared humanity. Yet, the idea of 
privilege distributed based on gender is inherently opposed to the notion of human 
dignity. All non consensual relationships of dominance and servility are inherently 
degrading, and this is exactly what gender is. First of all, gender is unconsensual in the 
sense that no one other than transgender people explicitly chooses their gender. Instead, 
gender is assigned at birth based on biological sex. If we understand consent as the act of 
“giv[ing] assent or approval,” it is clear that a newborn cannot possibly consent to 
gender, and therefore their delegated position of dominance or servility (Merriam 
Webster). Moreover, if gender ceased to be degrading, then what would be left could no 
longer be properly referred to as gender so long as we maintain our current understanding 
(the rationale for this claim mirrors the logic put forward in the previous paragraph). 
Fundamentally, gender implies coercive hierarchy.  
This observation is supported by Adrienne Martin in her unpublished paper, 
Against Mother’s Day and Employee Appreciation Day and Other Representations of 
Oppressive Expectations as Opportunities for Excellence and Beneficence. It is important 
to note that although not all women are mothers, the dominant, patriarchal construction of 
gender is largely built upon the traditionally gendered family. Many of the values that our 
society has imposed on mothers are also imposed on women generally without 
distinction. For example, one of the primary assumptions of motherhood is presence of 
certain domestic skills such as cooking, cleaning, and ability to handle childcare (Martin 
4). Yet, these are many of the same qualities that society generally attributes to all 
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women. This is evident in women’s occupational over representation in the caregiving 
industry which includes childcare, cleaning, and nursing (Erik Olin Wright). For this 
reason, the implicit assumptions connected to motherhood applies to women that are not 
mothers themselves. Consequently, observations regarding motherhood provide critical 
insights into gender generally.   
Returning to Martin’s paper, one of her foundational assertions is the idea that 
motherhood within the traditionally gendered family places “oppressive expectations” on 
mothers (Martin 5). Most forcefully, as I have mentioned, an expectation of domesticity 
defines what is normatively required of mothers within the traditionally gendered family 
(Martin 4). Implicit in domesticity is the willingness to sacrifice your own self interest for 
the good of others. Martin points this out stating, “when push comes to shove, you will 
put your child’s interests before anyone else’s, including your own (Martin 4).” Martin 
supports this point by examining mothers day advertisements that by and large “depic[t] 
an onslaught of domestic labor, demanding and needy kids, helpless male partners, and 
exhausted moms (Martin 4).” It is with this background that Martin rightfully asserts that 
the traditional idea of mothers as“self-sacrificing care-givers, nurturers, and homemakers 
(Martin 4).” 
Given that motherhood’s historical and contemporary construction mandates that 
mothers must sacrifice their own interests in order to fulfill their duty to the family, 
“mother” is a position of servitude within the hierarchy that characterizes that 
traditionally gendered family. Critically, this hierarchy places men in a dominant position 
(delegation of privilege along the basis of gender), while promoting women;s 
subservience. As I have stated, the assumptions of motherhood also apply to women 
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generally. Women are frequently evaluated on these same qualities even if they are not 
mothers. If we understand the assumptions of the traditionally gendered family as the 
foundation for the construction of gender, then it is clear that the dynamics that exist 
within the family apply to all women (Okin 101). Therefore, the delegation of privilege 
that exists within the family corresponds to the patriarchal hierarchy that all of us exist 
within regardless of whether we have children. Flatly, the delegation of privileges that I 
point out in my definition is a recognition of the definite hierarchy found in the concept 
of gender. As presently constructed, gender is antithetical to the idea of equality between 
men and women.  
Transitioning, in speaking of expectations, I must first point out that gender is an 
inherently social phenomena. It is an unending process that we all, at least passively, 
participate in. Unlike biological sex, which has a scientific basis (xx vs xy 
chromosomes), gender is constructed within collectives. There is no reason why gender 
must take the form that it does currently, other than the historical fact that we have given 
the concept a specific meaning collectively over time. Gender very well could have taken 
a different form. With this in mind, it is clear that gender cannot be separated from its 
expectations, as expectations are simply a manifestation of the fact that gender exists only 
through human sociality and judgements. 
I should also differentiate between two types of expectations. There are the 
expectations that we have of others, and the expectations that we have regarding our own 
worth and what we deserve. These are two closely related concepts, with expectations of 
self frequently enforcing gender, and expectations of others underwriting distributive 
injustices. Understanding that expectations characterize gender is critical to both 
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understanding gender enforcement, as well as gender from the perspective of distributive 
justice. I will focus on enforcement shortly, but first I want to think about expectations as 
being “delegated.”  
What relevance do gendered expectations have to distributive justice? Gender 
imposes on every human a normative conception of what constitutes a proper life. Put 
simply, gender tells everyone what their place in the world is and how they should live. 
This does not only include the actions that we should take, but also what responses our 
actions rightfully merit from others. Put another way, this means that gender shapes how 
we perceive what we deserve. In the context of distributive justice, this is important 
because it speaks to why different distributive disparities exist between men and women, 
and how they go unnoticed and unchallenged. The delegation of a sepcific expectations 
based on biological sex translates directly into material differences. In this way, gender 
based delegation of expectations facilitates the unjust distribution of social goods in a 
way that is to the benefit of men only.  
Concretely, this translates to wealth given women’s overrepresentation within 
“caregiving” professions that are typically undervalued, and more vulnerable place within 
the workforce. This works on many levels. To give a few examples, as I mentioned in the 
section on privilege, one effect of gender is occupational segregation that is characterized 
in part by women occupying a disproportionately large share of caregiving jobs (Olin 
Wright). Here, expectations function within the individual by shaping people's ideas of 
what they should aspire to, based on the characteristics they are normatively expected to 
possess and develop according to gender. These careers are then consequently devalued 
because of the way that patriarchy places greater importance on typically male 
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professions (Olin Wright). In this case, expectations function by shaping individuals 
ideas of what they deserve. Men, who have historically had control of how the world is 
ordered, feel their occupations are more important. Simultaneously, women are 
conditioned to expect that their work is less valuable and that they deserve less.  
Another reason for why women’s economic position is weaker than men’s on 
aggregate is the domestic burdens shouldered by women. This unjust burden makes it 
more difficult for women to participate in the workforce in a way that largely does not 
apply to men. Women may not choose to enter the workforce at all, particularly 
considering the fact that the traditionally gendered family implies a father in the formal 
labor market, while the mother handles the enormous amount of unpaid labor that exists 
within the household. Moreover, workplaces have historically been ordered around this 
assumption, as evidenced by office hours and parental leave policies, that allow workers 
little ability to handle domestic labor as well as wage labor (Okin 4). Additionally, 
women may choose to leave the labor force because of these very same burdens. In these 
cases, expectations determine what each member of the family's role should be. This is 
enforced by expectations that are imposed by others, but here I am only focusing on 
expectations of ourselves. Clearly, the implicit expectations present in gender hold great 
weight in determining the distribution of economic power between men and women. 
Beyond economic power, expectations also impact self respect and our ability to 
prioritize our own desires.  In Feminist Contractarianism, Jean Hampton cites a study by 
Carol Gilligan that concluded that gender creates distinct “interests,” in the same way as 
the division of labor. Hampton uses the example of two children, Jack and Amy, to 
illuminate the way in which society creates distinct ways of thinking for men and women 
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from the time that they are children (Hampton 231). Jack’s response to the question of 
balancing “responsibility to oneself and responsibility to others'' prioritizes self-interest 
(Hampton 228). On the other hand, Amy’s response shows much more deference to the 
needs of others. However, while this may seem preferable, Amy’s answer fails to place 
weight upon her own desires (Hampton 230). Unlike Jack, she is not as confident about 
the value of her interests. These two contrasting responses signify two separate, gendered 
ways of constructing morality (Hampton 229). Hampton makes clear her support for the 
idea that gender influences our self-conceptions of morality stating that the children’s 
respective answers serve to justify their future dominance/subservience (Hampton 231). 
This is an example of how the delegation of expectations on the basis of gender affects 




 Shifting, I now want to focus on what I mean when I say that gender as a 
construct is socially and institutionally enforced. Socially, one major source of genders 
power is found within the family and between peers. What exactly do I mean by 
enforced? As stated in my definition, inextricably linked to gender as presently 
constructed is the idea that men and women have different normative expectations 
governing their behavior and presentation. Put another way, gender is a reflection of the 
reality that men and women have imposed upon them different conceptions of how they 
should live and behave. These conceptions of what qualifies as a proper life based on 
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gender roles are not toothless.  As Erik Olin Wright writes in his paper, In Defense of 
Genderlessness, 
“for gender relations to exist there must be socially recognized norms that 
enforce these relations through various kinds of affirmations and sanctions... if 
there are no normative pressures to behave in particular ways because of one’s 
sex, then gender relations do not exist” (Olin Wright).”  
 What do these affirmations and sanctions look like in our daily lives? I am sure 
that we can all think of instances from our childhood where a young boy was teased for 
interest in something that was perceived to be feminine. Similarly, I would assume that 
we all witnessed times where  young girls were excluded from spaces or  activities that 
are frequently conceived of as masculine. This is an example of social sanctions that 
work to enforce gender roles. 
On the other hand, affirmations can be seen in parents encouraging certain 
activities over others, or the toys the buy for their children. These are just a few small 
examples of how virtually everyone encounters the force of gender throughout their 
development. Certainly, experiences and pressures like these can be very formative in 
what we come to believe is acceptable for us to desire. Our peers play a major role in 
shaping the people we become, from what we value to our self image. However, there are 
much more insidious examples of how the social enforcement of unjust gender roles limit 
individuals ability to live their most fulfilling life.  
 Susan Burton is an activist working to provide support to formerly incarcerated 
women. Her memoir, Becoming Ms. Burton, offers a lot of important, personal insight 
into the unique gender based obstacles poor black women face in pursuit of the best life 
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possible. In particular, her discussion of teen motherhood illuminates the oppressive force 
of the domestic duties that are central to the unjust construction of womanhood For 
example, Susan Burton decided that she wanted to return to school in order to advance 
her career opportunities (Burton, 44). However, when she told the class that she had a 
baby over the summer, her teacher replied “then why are you here” in front of the entire 
class (Burton, 44). The shame Burton felt as a result of this comment pushed her to drop 
out (Burton, 44).  Burton identifies that this experience is not unique to her stating, “ too 
often, black girls like me were considered dropouts but were really “push-outs”—pushed 
out of opportunities that school should have provided (Burton 45).” 
 This excerpt exemplifies two separate levels of gender enforcement 
simultaneously, institutional and interpersonal. On an institutional level, it is important to 
note that there is no reason that parenthood and pursuing education must be incompatible 
in a just society. Nevertheless, the unequal, unpaid domestic labor that characterizes the 
traditionally gendered family, is one of the most important factors limiting women’s 
agency (Okin 4). One of the most fundamental assumptions of gender/the traditionally 
gendered family is that women will take care of children while men work. As Susan 
Moler Okin puts it in Justice, Gender and the Family, gendered society is organized in a 
way such that “serious and committed members of the workforce (regardless of class) do 
not have a primary responsibility or even shared responsibility, for the rearing of children 
(Okin 5).” This assumption, which is only one of the many implicit in gender, is evident 
of the ordering of virtually all of our institutions, not just the workplace (Okin). With 
background, it is evident that free, quality childcare would help take the force out of this 
particular aspect of gender. The fact that this is not a social good provided by the state 
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speaks is testament to the patriarchy that affords more weight to securing men’s agency 
and interest than women’s.  
Education is another institution in which we see the very same consequences of 
gender left unchallenged. Okin argues that this is evidenced in schools lack of 
attentiveness to parents holding in jobs in scheduling matters (Okin 5). I want to make a 
slightly different, but related point. As I mentioned, if our government cared about 
promoting women’s agency, free childcare would be a great step, and would also 
simultaneously erode that aspect of gender. Government’s unwillingness to secure 
childcare as a right is one of the most profound ways that gender as currently constructed 
is maintained and enforced. In this way, gender takes women’s subservience for granted 
and does not seek to promote their unique needs.  
Returning to Susan Burton’s experience of high school motherhood, if free childcare was 
seen as a right, it is far more likely that she would have been able to finish school. 
Although, this is not only for the straightforward reason that it would be a burden off her 
shoulder. 
 Perhaps just as importantly, the normative gendered assumption that she was 
failing to fulfill her motherly duties by being at school would most likely be less 
powerful. On the interpersonal level, Burton’s teacher's cruel statement exemplifies the 
way in which shame is weaponized to enforce the gendered expectation and duty of 
motherhood. Her teachers' words would not have had the same biting force if women 
were expected, like men, to seek to advance their career prospects, rather than prioritize 
their familial duties. But in a world where gender demands and assumes that women take 
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on far more than their fair share within the family, Burton’s admirable act of returning to 
school despite all the obstacles was met with ridicule. 
This perspective is supported by Erik Olin Wright who states, “gender norms 
impose real costs on people who violate those norms and this restricts access to the social 
means for a flourishing life for people whose gender-linked dispositions do not 
correspond to those normative expectations (Olin Wright).” In this case, Burton’s 
teacher’s enforcement of sexist expectations of gender created a hostile learning 
environment that drove Burton to drop out, which was one of the primary factors that left 
Burton vulnerable to prositution and consequently incarceration. The importance of 
gender can not be understated in how Burton’s life would develop over the foreseeable 
future. 
 At the same time, it is imperative to point out that, as a poor black woman, Burton 
faced gender oppression in a way that was distinct from what a rich, or a  white woman 
would experience. Burton observed the dynamic between white-teen mothers who 
wanted to keep their child rather than giving it up for adoption. Burton recalled that the 
nurses tried to talk them out of it arguing that their baby would find a loving home 
(Burton, 43). The nurses would also emphasize all the things the mother would miss out 
upon by keeping the child such as a social life, college and marriage (Burton, 43). 
However, when Burton told the nurse she wanted to keep the kid, she did not receive any 
advice. As Susan Burton pessimistically observes, “apparently, in 1966, wonderful 
parents and wonderful homes weren’t waiting for little black babies. Nor did I have a 
wonderful rest of my life full of opportunities to return to (Burton, 43).” This is an 
example of the unique way the burden of motherhood is felt by poor black women given 
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the way in which race and class compound with gender. Because of her race and class, 
motherhood was pushed upon Susan Burton more strongly than it would have been for a 
white woman. 
 For this reason, my definition would not be complete without the clause that 
states, “the burdens associated with gender are not felt equally by all women and 
compound with other forms of vulnerability (race, class positions, disability) to create 
unique challenges.” This sentence is included to account for the idea of intersectionality 
first articulated by Kimberlé Crenshaw in her groundbreaking publication 
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. In this work, 
Crenshaw focuses on the failings of antidiscrimination law to adequately address the 
ways in which black women are uniquely vulnerable given that the “the intersectional 
experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism (Crenshaw 1-2).” Crenshaw 
argues that the orthodox “single-axis” analysis of discrimination centers the most 
priveleged subgroup within the larger body, thereby erasing the experiences of those with 
multiple identities through which they experience oppression (Crenshaw 1-2). In other 
words, the dominant mode of understanding sexism is based on the experiences of white 
women, resulting in black womens unique burdens being left outside of the scope of 
discourse on gender. It is from this background that we arrive at the “Crenshaw 
imperative,” which asks of us to “focus attention on the predicament of the most 
disadvantaged classes of people (Martin 4-5).”  
 Why is intersectionality important? Without intersectionality, we would have an 
incomplete and inaccurate understanding of gender. As exemplified in Burton’s memoir, 
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without an intersectional perspective we are unable to understand the unique needs of 
black women, or poor women, or undocumented women for example. Not only would we 
be at an epistemological disadvantage, but the absence of an intersectional perspective is 
responsible for the failures of policies that attempt to remedy gender based burdens faced 
by women.  
 
GENDER: “MORALLY ARBITRARY” AND ASSIGNED AT BIRTH  
 
In my definition, I refer to gender as a “morally arbitrary” characteristic. For 
context, this phrase has its roots in John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. In considering 
distributive justice, Rawls asserts that, “no one deserves his place in the distribution of 
natural assets any more than he deserves his initial starting place in society (Rawls 274).” 
In Rawls’ view, the unearned advantages that some of us have, whether it be natural 
talent, familial heritage, or race just to name a few, should have no impact on the 
“distributive shares” that we receive in a just society (Rawls 274). As Rawls puts it, “the 
initial endowment of natural assets and the contingencies of their growth and nurture in 
early life are arbitrary from a moral point of view (Rawls 274).” Moreover, in the original 
position, behind the veil of ignorance, “morally arbitrary” characteristics are supposed to 
be obscured so that participants will make rational decisions informed by the recognition 
that they could potentially find themselves in the position of the most disadvantaged 
(Rawls 118-119).   
In Justice, Gender, and the Family, Okin highlights the shocking lack of attention 
that gender receives in the rest of A Theory of Justice, which may escape those reading 
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the text with an inattention to gender and feminist theory (Okin 91). As Moller Okin 
points out Rawls fails to explicitly mention gender in his discussion of morally 
arbitrary/irrelevant characteristics (Moller Okin 91). Moreover, Rawls also leaves the 
family outside the scope of justice by assuming it to be a just institution (Okin 97). 
Consequently, by assuming the family to be a just institution, Rawls ensures that gender 
based injustice will persist even after the application of his two principles of justice (Okin 
99). This assumption is particularly concerning in the context of Rawls’ framework 
considering that he holds the family to be the primary institution responsible for the 
moral education of children (Okin 98). However, if the family fails to be just, then 
children are likely internalizing injustice from a morally corrupt source (Okin 100). 
 Nevertheless, Okin acknowledges that, “Rawls has made it clear that sex is one 
of those morally irrelevant contingencies that are hidden by the veil of ignorance (Okin 
91).” However, she contends that it is possible that gender is not a morally arbitrary 
characteristic as understood in the context of the original position (Okin 102). This 
objection finds is rooted in the idea that a “morally irrelevant characteristic” is one that 
exists “such that human beings really can hypothesize ignorance of this fact about them 
(Okin 105).” In line with other feminist thinkers, Okin asserts that women have a 
“distinct standpoint” that cannot be properly accounted for without the actual inclusion of 
women (Okin 106-107). For this reason, even if the family is subject to Rawls’ two 
principles and gender is hidden by the veil of ignorance, it is entirely possible that gender 
injustice will persist (Okin 101-102). As Okin argues, dismantling this form of injustice 
requires that “those in the original position must take special account of the perspective 
of women (Okin 102). If this task is not one that men can accomplish and can only be 
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done by women because of the specificity of their lived experience, it would seem that 
holding gender to be “morally irrelevant” in the Rawlsian sense still presents profound 
challenges to the attainment of justice.  
My inclusion of the term “morally arbitrary” is not a repudiation of this argument 
by Moller Okin. I certainly agree, and will specifically acknowledge multiple times in 
this paper, that one consequence of gender is the development of uniquely male and 
female standpoints. I use the phrase to make clear that gender should not dictate our life 
prospects, what we deserve, or what we receive. In other words, I use this term to further 
tie my argument to the broader discourse of distributive justice. Critically, “what we 
receive” does not only refer to wealth, but also respect, autonomy, and opportunities to 
define the ends we wish to pursue in life. If we accept gender as a “morally arbitrary” 
characteristic in this sense, then there is an injustice in using this characteristic as the 
basis for the distribution of social goods. Likewise, if gender is morally arbitrary, then 
using it as a basis for the delegation of “duties, privileges and expectations” is also 
clearly wrong. 
Now turning to perhaps the most controversial part of my definition, I state that 
gender is based on “biological sex assigned at birth.” However, as I mentioned in my 
introduction, many readers may feel that this definition is uninclusive of transgender 
people. I again want to emphasize that this is because I have sought to give an operational 
definition of gender rather than a normative one. My intention has been to define gender 
in its most traditional sense, with a particular focus on the ways in which gender degrades 
agency and human dignity. My definition is a reflection of how gender has historically 
functioned and continues to operate, rather than what gender should be (if it should exist 
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at all). Undeniably, transgender people have been marginalized within the orthodox 
gender binary. Often times, this exclusion is accompanied by tragic, pervasive  violence, 
particularly for transgender black women.  
With this in mind, a historical, operative definition of gender that is inclusive of 
transgender individuals actually erases the struggles that this particularly vulnerable 
group faces. If discrimination and violence against transgender people is a product of our 
current unjust construction of gender, than this fact must be reflected in the definition. 
The most logical way to go about this is to create an operational definition that reflects 
the exclusion that transgender people face in their daily lives. Anything else would be 
ahistorical, as well as a disservice to all though that continue to face oppression under the 
gender binary. Once more, my definition of gender is intended to reflect an unjust history 
of patriarchy for the sake of theorizing on why and how we must deconstruct this 
understanding. Just as my recognition of gender’s inherent power imbalance in favor of 
men does not mean that I believe this is just, my definition should not be understood to 
invalidate transgender people’s identities.  
 It is with this context that I define one fundamental characteristic of gender as 
being the linkage with biological sex assigned at birth. To reiterate, biological sex is a 
scientific observation (despite the fact that many individuals exist outside of the binary of 
male/female), while gender is a socially constructed concept that normatively defines 
individuals postitions within the world. The idea of assignment at birth is also reflected in 
Susan Moller Okin’s understanding when she states that gender is the ““ascriptive 
designation of positions and expectations of behavior in accordance with the inborn 
characteristic of sex (Okin 103).” Here the phrase “inborn charecteristic of sex” 
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corresponds with my idea of “assigned at birth.” Based on this characteristic, individuals 
then have forced upon them a normative conception of their role in relation to all other 
humans. It is this coercive designation that is gender. In this way, gender as traditionally 
definied must be account for sex as the basis for the delegation of gender roles and 
expectations.  Following this initial assignment of sex and subsequently gender, we are 
raised in ways that only enforce and entrench our gender identities.  
 As with other components of my definition of gender, if we erode the linkage 
between biological sex and gender, then we are actively participating in the 
deconstruction of gender. In this way, transgender people’s pursuit of their personal turth 
is a courageous, revolutionary act that erodes the linkage of sex and gender, and thereby 
gender itself. Challenging the automatic delegation of gender based on biological sex 
fundamentally undermines the idea that gender is based on sex assigned at birth, which is 
a central feature of gender more broadly. Clearly, the courage and societal acceptance of 
transgender and nonbinary individuals continuously moves us towards a less restrictive 
understanding of gender.The erosion described above is only one of the multiple ways 
that gender is being deconstructed. This process of deconstruction can also be termed 








CHAPTER 2: Gender Abolition 
Having established an operative definition of gender, it is now time to define gender 
abolition. In this chapter, I begin by establishing that, as a social creation, we have the 
ability to collectively deconstruct gender. I then establish that there are certain 
constitutive elements of gender without which gender ceases to exist in any recognizable 
form. I argue that achieving this amounts to genderlessness, which is the ultimate aim of 
gender abolition. When understood from this angle, gender abolition is not nearly as 
radical of a concept as it sounds, and in fact is identical to much more moderate notions 
such as egalitarianism. I then introduce the two different processes through, which I 
contend gender can be fully deconstructed.  
 Specifically, I posit that gender abolition can occur either through the erosion of 
the linkage of biological sex and gender, or by dismantling the delegative aspect of 
gender that assigns duties, privleges and expectations. Looking first at the uncoupling of 
biological sex and gender, I argue that, aside from questions of justice, the assignment of 
biological sex is a deeply flawed concept that fails to map onto gender in any coherent 
way, as is evidenced in the erasure of intersex and transgender people. For this reason, we 
should avoid gendering children at birth, while normalizing and affirming peoples’ right 
to transition to live in accordance with their self identity. I conclude the chapter by 
focusing on abolition of the delegative aspect of gender drawing upon Cheryll Harris’ 
Whiteness as Property and Angela Davis’ Women and Capitalism. Ultimately, this 
chapter is intended to lay the foundations for my subsequent analysis of the implicit calls 
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for gender abolition found in Karl Marx and Amartya Sen’s distinct visions of human 
development.  
  
What is Gender Abolition? 
 
What precisely is meant by gender abolition?  Recall in my previous chapter I 
defined gender as the societally and institutionally enforced construct that delegates 
duties, privileges, and expectations based on biological sex assigned at birth. I also 
emphasize that gender is taught and entrenched as children grow up, as failure to conform 
behaviors with gender-based expectations can have dramatic social, economic and legal 
ramifications. I bring up these two clauses because they clearly put forward the idea that 
gender is a social creation, rather than an inescapable fact of human existence. The first 
clause simultaneously distinguishes between and connects biological sex with gender, 
which is the attached normative set of duties and expectations created by humans. As a 
creation of humans, it is apparent that gender could be constructed in an entirely different 
way. 
 The implications of holding gender as a social construction are briefly explored 
by Oyèrónkẹ Oyèwùmí in Visualising the Body. Oyèwùmí argues that, because gender is 
created by humans, its construction must vary “across time and space (Oyèwùmí 463). 
Additionally, conceiving of gender in this way also suggests that there was a time before 
the existence of gender (Oyèwùmí 464). Perhaps most importantly to the overall aim of 
this thesis, with this recognition it would seem theoretically possible to transcend beyond 
gender and return to a state of genderlessness.  
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The second clause that I have restated above is intended to illuminate the primary 
mechanism through which the patriarchal construction of gender that has become nearly 
universal is maintained. As a social construction, gender must be maintained through 
affirmations and sanctions that enforce individuals’ adherence to their assigned social 
roles. As Judith Lorber points out, this process begins at birth as exemplified in “the 
choice of names, blankets, and clothing (Hughes and Dvorsky 7). Critically, if there was 
no enforcement of gender, gender would no longer exist in any recognizable form. 
 Opponents of this perspective often point to physical differences between the 
sexes as evidence that gender is natural and does not necessitate maintenance, instead 
holding that it is an immutable biological reality. However, while biological variation 
certainly exists between the sexes, we should not mistake this as constituting gender in 
and of itself. As Brian D. Earp points out in Abolishing Gender,  
Even if there is some biological basis to the mental association people have 
between certain traits and masculinity or femininity, it wouldn’t entitle us to jump 
from a descriptive “is” to a prescriptive “ought” (that is, to a socially enforced 
set of rules for how males or females should act, think, feel, or relate to others).” 
- (Earp 5-6) 
In other words, the inequality of the genders is not found in difference between men and 
women alone, but instead within the normative force that underlies the concept. With this 
in mind, it is clear that a genderless society would not neccessarily need to be 
androgynous. Instead, what is more important is people's ability to freely choose what 
they value and exercise free agency. To connect this back to my broader point, the 
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enforcement of gender from the time we are children is perhaps the greatest impediment 
to the realization of this worthy end.  
 Fundamentally, we exist within a gendered world, and more specifically a 
patriarchal world. This particular construction is what Earp refers to as the Dominant 
Gender Ideology (DGI) (Earp 3). As I mentioned in the previous chapter, this reality is 
reflected in everything from men’s economic and social domination to the 
disproportionate delegation of domestic labor to women, as well as the different virtues 
that men and women are supposed to cultivate to name just a few manifestations. On a 
deeper level, Earp points out that living in a gendered world effectively means that 
“knowing what someone’s genitals look like” has “predictive value for guessing their 
style of dress, their grooming habits, their physical mannerisms, sexual preferences, 
career ambitions, psychological profile, or ways of interacting with others (Earp 7).” I 
feel this point is extremely compelling in that it illuminates the absurdity of a concept 
that we largely take for granted assuming gender to be natural. What does someone’s 
genitals have to do with their career ambitions? Nothing absent the construction of 
gender.  
 Now, if our society failed to be gendered, then we could say that gender has been 
“abolished (Earp 2).” This is the sense in which I use the term gender abolition. To have 
abolished gender is simply to live in a genderless soceity. In other words, the construction 
of gender has been dismantled. In the following pages, I argue that this occurs in two 
distinct ways. Gender can be deconstucted either through the erosion the linkage between 
biological sex assigned at birth and gender, or by changing the relationships of 
dominance and subservience and their respective duties and expectations that charecterize 
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the traditional gender binary. I will explore this topic in greater depth in the following 
pages, but here I must make explicit an intimately related point.  
With this understanding of the nature of complete gender abolition, it follows that 
any act that moves us towards genderlessness is an act of abolition. More specifically, 
whatever deteriorates the force of the linkage between biological sex and normative 
societal expectation (gender) constitutes gender abolition. In the same way, altering the 
specific duties, privileges and expectations in a way that subverts our present 
construction of gender qualifies as abolition. Perhaps the most important takeaway here is 
that abolition does not require an immediate, total departure from gender. This 
uncharitable view is somewhat understandable given the history and power associated 
with a word like abolition. Nevertheless, abolition in the context of this thesis refers to 
the gradual process of degendering society. If this process is completed to its fullest 
extent, then the result is genderlessness and thus complete gender abolition. 
As I have alluded to above, the idea represented by the phrase “gender abolition” 
can be expressed with different language. Gender abolition is perhaps the most radical 
way of expressing this ideal, however more moderate articulations such as “gender 
egalitarianism” still express essentially the same message (Olin Wright). This is the core 
contention in Erik Olin Wright’s In Defense of Genderlessness. Wright argues that  
“while promoting gender equality moves us in the direction of egalitarian ideals, 
ultimately these ideals involve the dissolution of gender...policies which 
effectively neutralize the inegalitarian effects of the gender relations will also 
tend to undermine the norms which reproduce those relations. In the long term, 
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therefore, serious gender egalitarian policies will also undermine gender” - (Olin 
Wright) 
Here, Olin Wright’s argument hinges on the fact that gender is necessarily incompatible 
with the concept of egalitarianism. If we desire equality between the sexes, this cannot 
exist so long as gender endures. This fits neatly with my definition which emphasizes that 
one of the constitutive components of gender is normative differentiation between the 
sexes with regards to expectations, duties and privileges to the benefit of men. Although 
Olin Wright never uses the term abolition explicitly, his point largely mirrors my 
contention in the preceding paragraph that abolition is any act that furthers the end of 
genderlessness.  
With this in mind, it is apparent that gender abolition and gender 
equality/egalitarianism are merely different ways of articulating the same goal, insofar as 
gender equality is an oxymoron. To reiterate, gender abolition is the complete cultivation 
of a genderless society. Keeping this in mind, full realization of gender 
equality/egalitarianism is impossible given that gender is inseparable from inequality 
definitionally speaking. Opponents of this view may object that it is possible to have a 
construction of gender that is equal, or at the least more equal than the present 
manifestation. However, if gender failed to be unequal it would no longer exist in any 
recognizable form. Moreover, any partial realization of gender equality (meaning 
progress from our current position) would be an act of abolition in that the subsequent 
construction of gender would more closely align with the ultimate goal of genderlessness.  
Before delving more deeply into my view on the process of gender abolition, I 
want to briefly touch on a few more terms that closely relate to and resemble this 
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concept. Throughout this thesis, I speak of the deconstruction of gender. By 
deconstruction, as with abolition, I am referring to a process that leads us in the direction 
of genderlessness. Here, my rationale is largely based upon Oyèrónkẹ Oyèwùmí 
contention that if gender is a social construct, there was once a prior time during which 
gender existed in a radically different form. This brings me to my next term. In this 
context, to deconstruct is also to dismantle gender. In subsequent chapters, I will use 
these two terms interchangeably. As with deconstruction, dismantling gender furthers the 
achievement of the genderless society that abolition requires. 
While I will not use the next two terms, they are still worth bringing up given 
their relevance to feminist discourse broadly. Gender eliminativism, referring to the 
elimination of gender, mirrors the concept of abolition. Not to belabor this point, if 
gender is eliminated it no longer exists and thus genderlessness has been achieved. In this 
way, gender eliminativism is indistinguishable from gender abolition. Similarly, 
postgenderism is focused on exploring what exactly a completely genderless world would 
look like, but is distinct in the sense that proponents of this view would emphasize the 
importance of controlling for the physical differences between the sexes (Hughes and 
Dvorsky 2).  
As Hughes and Dvorsky articulate in Postgenderism: Beyond the Gender Binary, 
“postgenderism confronts the limits of a social constructionist account of gender and 
sexuality, and proposes that the transcending of gender by social and political means is 
now being complemented and completed by technological means.” This is slightly 
different from the view of abolition that I put forward in that my framework is based 
upon acceptance of the idea that gender can be dismantled while allowing physical 
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difference to persist. Referring to physical/biological difference, perhaps the most 
important consideration from a postgenderist perspective is women’s capacity for 
childbirth, while attention is also given to issues such as agressions’ relation to 
testosterone (Highes and Dvorsky 10-13).  
Overall, the main point that I have been trying to drive home thus far is that 
gender abolition is not as radical of a concept as it sounds (not that there is anything 
wrong with something being radical). Gender abolition could equally be termed gender 
equality or gender egalitarianism. Very few people would have any problems with these 
terms. However, I eschew the use of these terms given their internal logical inconsistency 
rooted in the reality that gender cannot exist absent inequality. At the very same time, my 
analysis suggests that gender equality may require much more than what people typically 
think. Certainly, many proponents of gender justice believe that the categories of “man” 
and “woman” can continue to persist while people with these identities are treated 
equally. However, this is antithetical to the understanding of gender put forward in this 
thesis. The categories of man and woman inherently imply both inequality and hierarchy. 
Therefore, approaching any semblance of equality necessitates the deconstruction of 
gender. While concrete steps towards abolition may be much more mundane than we 
typically believe, full actualization of the end of gender equality requires a radical shift in 
how we order society. 
The primary aim of gender abolition is the creation of a genderless society, which 
does not mean an androgynous one. Instead, a genderless society would be one in which 
people interact as equals without force of normative expectations assigned based upon 
genetalia. While the use of the term “abolition” certainly calls to mind legal action, this 
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does not mean that identification with gender will be punished in the courts. This is not to 
say that we cannot move towards abolition through legal avenues, but rather the process 
of abolition also occurs in much more diffuse and subtle ways within social institutions. 
 
Uncoupling Sex and Gender 
 
As I see it, there are two primary processes through which gender may be 
dismantled. Firstly, gender abolition can occur through the erosion of the linkage between 
assigned biological sex and the normative social roles associated with gender. If assigned 
biological sex no longer serves as the basis of gender roles, people would theoretically be 
able to freely choose what gender role to inhabit. Beyond the fact that the imposition of 
gender based upon assigned biological sex represents a significant form of unfreedom, 
assigning sex at birth and linking it to gender is also flawed in its erasure of intersex 
people. Critically, with this understanding of gender abolition, transgender people are a 
part of a fundamentally revolutionary act of deconstruction. 
 It is also important to recognize that this assignment and linkage does not only 
occur at birth. Instead, the linkage between sex and gender is entrenched over time as 
gender is enforced throughout childhood, which brings me to my second point. Abolition 
can also function through weakening the delegative/distributive aspect of gender. In other 
words, if gender no longer functions as the basis for the delegation of duties, 
expectations, and privileges as I mention in my definition, then what is left no longer 
constitutes gender. This can occur through deconstructing the norms and expectations 
associated with gender directly. 
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As I mentioned in the preceding chapter, one of the fundamental components of 
gender is its linkage to biological sex assigned at birth. While I explicitly drew upon the 
work of Susan Moller Okin in the last chapter to support the fact that this is a key part of 
gender, this view is widely accepted throughout feminist literature. To further support 
this position with the work of an author cited in this chapter, Brian D. Earp defines sex as 
“roughly, the physical or biological distinction between females and males,” which is 
“linked to socially enforced gender roles that prescribe how people should be and behave 
(Earp 1).” While phrased slightly differently, this fits neatly with my definition of gender 
and more specifically with my discussion of this very subject in the final paragraphs of 
chapter one. To briefly reiterate, gender connects individuals’ biological sex with social 
expectations and positionality. At its core, gender holds biological sex as the foundational 
way of ordering the delegation of gender roles and expectations.  
Critically, individuals initially have no choice what gender they exist in within the 
world. It is not until people have the vocabulary to articulate their feelings and interests 
that this immediate linkage can be challenged in any way (absent remarkably 
unconventional parents). Problematically, people generally embrace the gender they are 
assigned (there are more cisgender than transgender or nonbinary people), given the years 
of conditioning we recieve. This is particularly concerning given that, as I have argued, 
gender is inherently hierarchical. This means that around half of our population has been 
assigned a position of servility based on the morally arbitrary characteristic of sex. The 
enforcement of this injustice is so pervasive that we often fail to question and critique the 
basis of this designation.  
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As Susan Moller Okin states, the Rawlsian idea of fair equality of opportunity 
mandated by his second principle which states that, “Social and economic inequalities are 
to be arranged so that they are…attached to positions and offices open to all (Rawls 53)" 
is incompatible with our current construction of gender (Okin 103). Moller Okin points 
out that “positions and offices” must include gender positions such as “husband and wife 
[or] mother and father (Okin 103).” No one would dispute that these gender roles form 
the basis of significant “social and economic inequalities,” particularly considering the 
domestic burden women shoulder under the traditional construction of gender (Okin 
103). Recognizing this fact, adherence to Rawls second principle requires “choice of 
occupation of both sexes (Okin 103).” This choice does not truly exist within the current 
coercive definition of gender that ascribes different conceptions of a proper life for men 
and women as defined by their biological sex assigned at birth.  
Another crucial  reason we have to reject the linkage between biological sex and 
gender relates to the erasure of intersex individuals. In its most restrictive yet pervasive 
form (what Earp terms DGI), gender exists within a binary with the categories of man 
and woman (Montañez).  However, we must recognize that, despite what we have been 
conditioned to believe, sex is not actually a binary (Montañez). Instead, as Amanda 
Montañez points out in Beyond XX and XY: The Extraordinary Complexity of Sex 
Determination, “determination of biological sex is staggeringly complex, involving not 
only anatomy but an intricate choreography of genetic and chemical factors that unfolds 
over time (Montañez).” She then follows this statement by defining intersex individuals 
as “those for whom sexual development follows an atypical trajectory (Montañez).” This 
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can range from differences in hormonal levels to “ambiguous genitals” to the presence of 
both male and female reproductive organs (Montañez). 
 It is important to note that intersex individuals are not merely a medical anomoly. 
In fact, as Hughes and Dvorsky point out, nearly 1.7% of the population may be intersex 
depending on what definition is used (Hughes and Dvorsky 3). If we take a more narrow 
view of intersexuality, defined as “conditions in which the person's chromosomes are a 
different sex than their phenotypic sex characteristics, or in which they have truly 
ambiguous genitalia,” the number is likely closer to 0.02% or roughly one in every 5,000 
children (Hughes and Dvorsky 3).  
 Nevertheless, sex is generally assigned based on genetalia at birth which is an 
incomplete picture at best (Montañez). As Montañez points out, this often leads to 
individuals having a gender chosen for them that does not align with their ultimate 
identity (Montañez). It is evident that the automatic linkage of assigned biological sex 
and gender is extremely problematic. At the most basic level, the concepts of sex and 
gender do not even map onto one another cleanly. We have far more than two sexes, yet 
we try to fit everyone into a gender binary at birth.  
One particularly dire consequence of this imposition of the gender binary is the 
reality that many intersex children have surgery at birth in order to literally mold their 
bodies to fit a “normative version of one or the other gender (Hughes and Dvorsky 3).” 
Many intersex activists vehemently oppose this inherently unconsensual practice for a 
wide variety of reasons ranging from “reduce[d] adult sexual sensitivity” to the reality 
that many individuals will be “assigned a gender at variance to their chromosomal sex or 
adult psychological gender identity (Hughes and Dvorsky 3).”  Additionally, perhaps the 
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most relevant reason from an abolitionist perspective is the contention that “there is no 
need to encourage children to ever choose either male or female gender roles (Hughes 
and Dvorsky 3).” 
Here, it is essential that I point out that not every culture has conceived of the 
linkage between gender and sex within a restrictive and inaccurate binary. Oyèrónkẹ 
Oyèwùmí reminds us that throughout human history a variety of cultures have included a 
“third” or “alternative” sex/gender (Oyèwùmí 465). Evidence of this phenomena exists as 
far back as Mesopotamian and ancient Egyptian society (Hughes and Dvorsky 4). One 
prominent example of a “third gender” among non western cultures cited by both 
Oyèwùmí as well as Hughes and Dvorsky is the Berdache. As Hughes and Dvorsky 
explain, “both males and females became berdache by cross-dressing, and there was no 
necessary relationship of their status to their physiology or sexual preferences (Hughes 
and Dvorsky 4). Within these cultures, the third sex/gender typically had their own 
unique social roles (Hughes and Dvorsky 3). While we certainly have reason to object to 
the delegation of social roles in this way on its own, leaving space for a third sex/gender 
is undeniably more inclusive for intersex individuals.   
However, it is also imperative that we recognize that under my definition, the 
presence of a “third gender” would actually mean that the three social categories would 
not actually constitute gender. This contention is supported by Oyèwùmí who reminds us 
that “the Western cultural system, which uses biology to map the social world, precludes 
the possibility of more than two genders because gender is the elaboration of the 
perceived sexual dimorphism of the human body into the social realm (Oyèwùmí 465).” 
In other words, because Oyèwùmí recognizes that the dominant gender ideology imposed 
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by the west (what I refer to as simply gender) is based on a linkage with a binary 
conception of biological sex, a schema that accomodates three genders cannot consitute 
gender as such. What exists in these cultures is not gender as I have defined. The 
existence of a third gender fundamentally undermines the binary conception of gender 
that is linked to biological sex.  
Of course, one may object that it is possible that something that resembles gender 
could be constructed in a hierarchical, trinary manner. While this sort of construction 
would likely be objectionable in its own right, it would also lack some of the binding 
force that makes gender such a restrictive concept. The existence of a third gender would 
weaken the force of the linkage between biological sex and gender, and could allow for 
men and women to more easily opt out of their assigned social roles. This is particularly 
true if the third gender was not attached to any biological indicators. If the third gender 
could be freely inhabited by any individual, then there would immediately be much 
greater fluidity and choice in how people live their lives.  
However, this third gender could certainly be reserved for intersex people 
specifically. Still, even in this case, the very existence of a third gender would complicate 
society's reliance on visual cues in the practice of gendering. There are many intersex 
people whose appearance embodies our paradigmatic view of what women and men 
should look like. If these people are suddenly sorted into a third gender, many people’s 
eyes would be opened with regard to how flawed our reliance on visual cues is for 
gendering. Here, it is worth pointing out that, in this scenario, we could rapidly head 
down a dystopian path where genital examinations are used to assign gender as recent 
legislation in Florida reminds us. This certainly would not be the liberatory shift that I 
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mention above.  Yet, absent this invasive policing of bodies, a third gender that 
acknowledges the existence of intersex people would fundamentally alter the way most 
people understand the constructed categories of woman and man.  
Keeping in mind my stated definition of gender abolition, it is clear that 
attempting to account for and stop the erasure of intersex people within the gender binary 
is an act of abolition. Eroding the linkage between assigned biological sex and gender is a 
deconstructive act leading us to a point more near to genderlessness. In affirming the 
existence of intersex people, the linkage aspect of gender begins to fall apart. If we cease 
to assign intersex people a binary sex at birth, there is no basis for the subsequent 
assignment of gender and its associated duties, expectations and privleges. So, it follows 
that one way that we can move towards abolition in a relatively small way is by breaking 
from the reductive, inaccurate binary conception of sex.  
More robustly, if we come to accept that we should not impose gender on intersex 
people in this way, we must question why it is permissible to gender children even when 
there is no sexual ambiguity. Some may argue that intersex individuals are an exceptional 
case because through surgically imposing one sex where there exists ambiguity we may 
“get it wrong” and choose a sex that will not align with individuals future identity. 
However, the existence of transgender people affirms that sex itself is an imperfect 
predictor of peoples’ gender idenity. Accordingly, we should not only avoid gendering 
intersex individuals, but all children.  
As I mentioned in my previous chapter, the increasing acceptance and visibility 
transgender people, like intersex people, represents a brave and revolutionary act of 
gender abolition. Recall in the previous chapter, the fact that my definition of gender 
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assumes a linkage with biological sex in a way that marginalizes transgender people is 
not a normative statement, but rather a reflection of the historical reality of transgender 
peoples social exclusion. Also, I should add that I do not intend to suggest that trans 
peoples’ gender identity is any less “real” than cisgender people. Instead, through 
affirming transgender peoples identities we are offered a new way of imagining gender 
that is closer to genderlessness than the patriarchal order that charecterizes the 
contemporary dominant gender ideology.  
With this being said, it is undeniable that the existence of transgender people 
challenges the linkage of biological sex and gender. Transgender people transition from 
their originally assigned gender to embrace an identity that aligns with their internal self 
(Hughes and Dvorsky 6-7). As gender is initially determined on the basis of biological 
sex, to transition is to erode the linkage between the two concepts. Because this linkage is  
at the core of what defines gender, transitioning must be understood as an act of gender 
deconstruction. Unfortunately, as I mention in my definition, deviations from the 
established construction of gender imposes real costs on those who fail to conform, as we 
see tradically exemplified in the incredible amount of violence faced by transgender 
people.  
To sum up my overall argument in this section, I argue one major avenue towards 
gender abolition involves the erosion of the linkage between sex and gender. We can 
deconstruct this aspect of gender by either ceasing to establish the linkage in the first 
place, or by rejecting the linkage once life is already in progress. My example of intersex 
individuals demonstrates that biological sex does not even map onto gender, so this 
linkage unsound from a purely scientific perspective. Moreover, even when there is no 
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ambiguity with regards to biological sex, this concept is still an inaccurate predictor of 
gender identity, so it would follow that we should refrain from gendering all babies, not 
just intersex babies. On the side of things, transgender people are at the forefront of 
dismantling the linkage of sex and gender after the initial assignment at birth. 
Transgender peoples’ bravery moves us in the direction of genderlessness in the sense 
that gender assumes the linkage of biological sex and gender. In both cases, we see 
clearly that abolition can occur through dismantling the assumed linkage of biological sex 
and the assignment of gender roles.  
 
Deconstructing Gendered Delegation 
 
The second way we can progress towards gender abolition is by dismantling the 
unequal assignment of distinct duties, expectations and privileges implied by gender. 
This effectively amounts to weakening the delegative aspect of gender. If gender ceases 
to serve as the basis for the delegation of social roles as explained in the previous chapter, 
then what remains no longer fits with the patriarchal construction of gender. For example, 
if the gendered concept motherhood no longer implies a disproportionate share of 
domestic labor to the detriment of women (and the opposite for fatherhood), then what 
we are left with is the gender neutral concept of parenthood.  
 The most direct path towards abolition requires the dismantling of the delegation 
of duties, privileges and expectations that define gender. Even if we weaken the 
automatic linkage of biological sex and gender, the social roles assigned by gender still 
perpetuate unjust inequality between men and women. This may cease to be true if the 
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linkage of biological sex and gender was entirely eradicated as individual’s social 
position would be more consensual as people would be free to choose their gender as 
they please. However, because gender is still deeply ingrained globally, if we accept 
genderlessness as a worthy end then, pragmatically speaking, we should not limit the 
scope of our efforts to one avenue alone. Instead, it is essential that we detach normative 
conceptions of what constitutes proper behavior from gender.  
Essentially, this means that whether someone identifies as a man or woman 
should have no correlation with how they are expected to order their lives. As is the case 
with uncoupling sex and gender, if gender roles were entirely deconstructed the result 
would be genderlessness because even if we still relied on a faulty conception of 
biological sex it could not be assigned to any tangible gender roles. In this way, any act 
that detaches external social expectations from gender, and to humanity generally, is an 
act of abolition. 
 To offer a parallel argument in support of this conclusion, consider the 
construction of race in America. As is the case with gender, race is a social construction 
as opposed to an immutable biological fact (Gannon, Scientific American). In fact, 
members from different races may share more genetic similarities than with other 
members of their own race (Gannon). As a social creation, in the same way as with 
gender, race necessarily varies in its construction across cultures and throughout history. 
Yet, in the cases of both race and gender, phenotypic differences obscure and legitimate 
the inequalities engendered by the degrading constructions of these two social categories 
(Harris 1778). For this reason, it is easy to overlook the various components of the 
construction of race and gender, particularly for those who benefit most. 
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What are the defining features of whiteness in the American context? As Cheryl 
Harris argues in Whiteness as Property, whiteness in the United States is rooted in 
exclusivity, power, domination as well as immense privilege that the courts have long 
protected as a property right (Harris 1714-1715). This closely mirrors the functioning of 
the delegative aspect of gender mentioned above. Harris explores the historical evolution 
of the American construction of whiteness which, as the title makes clear, is intimately 
connected with property. Harris points out that, at the inception of colonial America, race 
was a radically different concept compared to today, or even 100 years later (Harris 
1715-1716).  
Racialization, which is tantamount to the construction of race, served to justify 
attrocities like slavery and genocide (Harris 1715). Undoubtedly, “the construction of 
white identity... [was] intimately tied to the evolution and expansion of the system of 
chattel slavery (Harris 1717).” This is exemplified in the fact that whiteness came to be 
synonymous with freedom, while blackness “marked who was subject to enslavement 
(Harris 1718).” Critically, the construction of whiteness in the United States has evolved 
over the centuries, yet significant aspects of whiteness endure (Harris 1778). As Harris 
puts it, "Over time [whiteness] has changed in form, but it has retained its essential 
exclusionary character and continued to distort outcomes of legal disputes by favoring 
and protecting settled expectations of white privilege (Harris 1778)." Harris holds that 
this is clearly seen in the legal repudiation of affirmative action cases that challenge the 
unjust “baseline” of white privilege (Harris 1778).  
Nevertheless, over time whiteness and attached delegation of social position has 
been deconstructed, even if only to a minimal degree. For example, the literal abolition of 
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slavery deconstructed whitness in the sense that whiteness could no longer be understood 
as a “shield from slavery (Harris 1720).” This is not to say that slavery was truly 
abolished at this moment as the prison industrial complex reminds us every day. 
However, slavery was no longer explicitly tied to race, but instead to criminality and thus 
indirectly to race. More powerfully, Harris posits that affirmative action has the potential 
to deconstruct whiteness by “ de-legitim[izing] the assumptions surrounding existing 
inequality (Harris 1778).” In this way, to delegitimize the property interest in whiteness is 
to dismantle whiteness itself as constructed in the United States (Harris 1779). To apply 
this more specifically to the case of gender abolition, the dismantling of constitutive, 
delegative elements of a social construction like race necessarily erodes the force of the 
social category in question.  
If we fully dismantle whiteness in this sense, what is left? If whiteness no longer 
serves no longer serves to reify power and privilege then all that remains is a 
pseudoscientific category based on the predominance of skin color over all other traits. 
While people might hear “abolish whiteness” and be freaked out (especially in the 
context of culture wars) the core message, as is the case with gender abolition, is that if 
racial justice is attained it requires the deconstruction of the constitutive aspects of race, 
which is privilege as opposed to skin color. Certainly, in this case there will continue to 
be people who physically possess the characteristics associated with whiteness. However, 
without the attached property interests and social privileges, these individuals would not 
be “white” and instead just human. The phenotypic associated with their “whiteness” 
would have no bearing on their social position.  
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 Returning to my argument regarding the abolition of gender via the 
deconstruction of the delegative aspect of gender, as I previously established gender is 
socially constructed in very much the same way as race. Moreover, as I have established 
in my definition offered in chapter one, gender, as is the case with race, is intimately 
related to domination, privilege and expectations of self and others. In Women and 
Capitalism, Angela Davis explores women’s oppression and their potential for liberation 
through a Marxist lens. However, as my next chapter puts forward my own feminist 
reading of Marx’s work, here I will limit my focus to Davis’s suggestions for the 
women’s movement, rather than her specific analysis of Marx. Overall, I aim to illustrate 
the nature of abolition in the context of the gendered assignment of social roles 
 I want to begin by highlighting some important similarities between Davis’s 
observations and my definition of gender. First, Davis certainly conceives of gender as a 
social construction. This is evidenced by her statement that “human beings are not 
inexorably yoked to their biological constitution... The woman-man union, in all its 
dimensions, is very much mutable and always subject to social transformations (Davis 
151).” Here, the fact that the relationship between men and women is “subject to social 
transformations” essentially rejects determinism with regards to the meanings and values 
associated with “man” and “woman.” Critically, this also implies that it is possible to 
achieve a more equal, just relation between the two by altering the construction of gender 
itself. This point is made even more clearly when Davis asserts “the man-woman union 
will always be disfigured unless the woman has liberated herself as woman (Davis 152).” 
The phrase “liberated herself as woman” here represents a call for the fundamental 
reimagining of gender.   
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 Davis centers the economic subordination of women and its association with the 
traditionally gendered family as a core constitutive element of gender. Interestingly, she 
offers more support for this prominent feminist position by citing Engels, who was 
surprisingly attentive to gender dynamics and injustice within the family for a man of his 
time (or any time for that matter) (Davis 161). Davis reminds us that, “Engels was 
essentially correct to link the inferior status of the female to the hierarchical makeup of 
the family… [and] woman’s dependent rank within the family unit (Davis 161). She also 
focuses on the domestic duties shouldered by women which entrenches this asymmetric 
distribution of economic power stating that women “must bear the major responsibility 
for the internal labor guaranteeing [the families] preservation. These private domestic 
duties preclude more than marginal participation in social production (Davis 163).” She 
also highlights that women’s labor outside on the market is typically undervalued and 
held in disesteem relative to the work of men (Davis 163). I bring this up to say, Davis’s 
conception of gender largely offers support to my own definition and analysis.  
However, unlike a philosopher like Okin, Davis goes further in holding that 
women’s oppression is inextricably linked with capitalism (Davis 150). According to 
Davis, reform within the existing system is not possible, given that women’s participation 
in the formalized economy has had “reaffirming and amplifying effects on their 
oppression” for many women (Davis 170). It is with this background that Davis offers the 
most manifestly abolitionist passage of the paper. She states,  
“the demand for job equality - equal jobs and equal pay for the same jobs - is one 
of the indispensable prerequisites for an effective women’s liberation strategy. 
Such a demand, it need not be said, loses much of its meaning and can fall back 
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into the orbit of person unless it is acompanied by the fight for childcare centers, 
maternity leaves, free abortions and the entire complex of solutions to the 
uniquely female needs...these efforts must be seen as an essential ingredient of a 
broader thrust: the assault on the institutional structures which perpetuate the 
socially enforced inferiority of women (Davis 171-172)” 
It is here that we see more clearly what abolition through the deconstruction of the 
delegative aspect of gender looks like. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
gendered expectation that men will have a wife at home who is not engaged in the 
formalized economy affects the structuring of the workplace such that it fails to be 
responsive to the needs of parents (mothers) who are responsible for childcare. In this 
context, a policy promoting genderlessness is one that dismantles the force of gendered 
expectations and duties. If the state provides accessible childcare to all people, 
motherhood need not be associated with a disproportionate share of childcare (the 
traditionally gendered family necessitates that one parent sacrifice their professional 
ambitions if the family cannot pay for childcare).  
Obviously, gender would still endure as this is only one specific aspect, but 
policies like this deconstruct the delegative aspect of gender. Therefore, this constitutes 
an act of abolition. Moreover, by linking women’s oppression to capitalism (and 
specifically women’s position under capitalism), Davis also effectively connects 
women’s liberation to the abolition of capitalism and thus also women’s position within 
capitalist society. To extend this argument further, to eliminate women’s position within 
capitalism is to dismantle the gendered delegation of economic positionality for women, 
which is undoubtedly an act of abolition.  
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To briefly review the content and argumentation within this section, perhaps the 
most direct avenue for gender abolition is through deconstruction of the delegative aspect 
of gender. To be clear, what I am referring to here is the section of my definition where I 
position gender as a social construct that delegates duties, privileges, and expectations 
based on biological sex assigned at birth. I hold that the delegative aspect is a constitutive 
element of gender such that any deconstruction is an act of abolition that furthers the end 
of genderlessness. To support this conclusion, I offered a parallel argument focused on 
race, another analogous social construct. Using Cheryl Harris’s Whiteness as Property, I 
established that, given the fact that race has even less of a biological basis then gender, 
pursuing racial equity necessitates the erosion of property interest in whiteness and thus 
the abolition of whiteness. I then turned back to gender focusing on Angela Davis’s 
Women in Capitalism. I offer an interpretation of Davis’s work that frames her writing 
within the context of gender abolition. I argue that her critique of women’s position in 
capitalist society is effectively an attack on one part of the delegative aspect which is a 




To review the chapter, my argument began by establishing the idea that gender is 
a social creation. As such, it follows that gender can be deconstructed. Just as there was a 
time before gender, it is theoretically possible that there could be a time postgender. 
Subsequently, I define gender abolition in exactly this way. While gender abolition is 
certainly a very provocative term, it is really referring to the deconstruction of gender. 
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Critically, terms like gender egalitarianism actually imply gender abolition if they are to 
be realized to their fullest extent. In this way, gender abolition is anything that moves us 
towards a genderless world. This process occurs through the erosion of the constitutive 
elements of gender, such as genders delegative aspect and its linkage with biological sex. 
If these elements are deconstructed, what is left is not gender. Consequently, it is 
apparent that gender abolition can occur either through these two avenues.  
I first challenged the justice of the linkage of assigned biological sex and gender. 
As I demonstrated, the way biological sex is conceived of in relation to gender is 
reductive and unscientific. This is evidenced by the existence of intersex individuals, 
which should make us reconsider gendering children in the first place. With this in mind, 
refusing to accept an inaccurate picture of biological sex moves us in the direction of 
abolition as the two concepts no longer map cleanly onto one another. Moreover, we can 
also choose to reject the linkage of biological sex and gender further along in life. It is in 
this sense that transgender people are actively engaged in the revolutionary process of 
gender abolition. I then shifted my concentration to the process of dismantling the 
delegative aspect of gender. I held that any act that detaches external social expectations 
from gender, and to humanity generally, is an act of abolition. To illustrate what this 
would look like, I used examples from Cheryll Harris’ Whiteness as Property and Angela 
Davis’ Women and Capitalism. With this common understanding of abolition, I am now 
able to transition to my broader argument that both Marx and Sen’s visions for human 





CHAPTER 3: Marxist Argument for Gender Abolition 
Would a Marxist utopia be a genderless society? In the following section, drawing 
upon both On the Jewish Question or The German Ideology, I hold that Marx offers two 
visions of human advancement that both strongly imply the abolition of gender. 
Beginning with The German Ideology, I will argue that Marx’s call for the abolition of 
the division of labor equally applies to gender. Turning to On the Jewish Question, I will 
establish that the existence of gender stands in the way of Marx’s ideal of human 
emancipation. Based on his condemnation of the division of labor, and his standards for 
human emancipation, I argue an ideal Marxist society would require the abolition of 
gender. 
Karl Marx views the division of labor as the root of all inequality. Fundamentally, 
the division of labor creates an unequal distribution of material goods, power, and status. 
Relationships of dependence, originally created by the division of labor, over time 
translate into a difference in "material power (German Ideology 197)." It is evident that 
within a market higher value is placed upon certain goods and services. As society 
develops, exchanges between individuals within a market will inevitably give rise to a 
particular distribution of goods. At this point, the market-based inequality between 
individuals creates a class-based social hierarchy (German Ideology 170). Here, we see 
that the division of labor is not only the basis of distribution but inevitably creates an 
"unequal distribution… of labor and its products, hence property (German Ideology 
159)." 
Marx characterizes the first form of property as "tribal ownership," which 
involved a minimal division of labor beyond that which exists within families (German 
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Ideology 151). As the population rises and different families begin to interact, "ancient 
communal" ownership develops with the birth of the first cities (German Ideology 151). 
It is at this stage where we can observe the first instance of private property, though Marx 
notes that this is an exception to the communal ownership that characterizes the era 
(German Ideology 151).  Additionally, class distinction develops between master and 
slave (German Ideology 151). Next comes the emergence of the feudal system, which 
replaces "the directly producing class" of slaves with serfs (German Ideology 153). 
Through control of the land and military might, the nobility is able to maintain their 
position of control over the serfs (German Ideology 153).  Gradually, monarchs acquired 
larger and larger kingdoms (German Ideology 154). In the towns, guilds were beginning 
to form to protect the interests of "craftsmen" who, through the accumulation of small 
levels of capital, came to replicate the hierarchical structure present in the country 
(German Ideology 153). 
Through the accumulation of capital, we arrive at a scenario where only a certain 
subset of individuals have the means to create a business, which enables them to 
appropriate the labor of others, thereby amassing even more capital. The result of this 
process is "the division between capital and labor (German Ideology 190)." No longer is 
the laborer entitled to the products of their effort. Before humans entered into tribal 
ownership the isolated individual could accumulate capital through their labor. Under 
capitalism, the products of the workers' labor are alienated to the industrialist. Work no 
longer translates to capital. Instead, only capital can produce capital. Clearly, the division 
of labor creates a fundamentally unequal distribution of material goods within society. 
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Beyond the profound economic inequality caused by the division of labor, this 
practice constrains and directs individuals' thinking in a way that is incompatible with 
human advancement. Marx emphasizes that the division of labor by its very nature shapes 
an individual's conception of self. He explicitly states, “the division of labor only 
becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labor 
appears (German Ideology 159).”  Initially, humans have only a rough “herd 
consciousness (German Ideology 158).” As our productive capabilities increase, so too 
does our consciousness (German Ideology 158). Because each individuals’ consciousness 
reflects their means of material production, as the division of labor emerges individuals 
are set at odds with each other. The way our social class position affects our 
consciousness is evidenced in the differentiation between class interests, as exemplified 
by the antagonism of town and country (German Ideology 176). The division of labor 
creates specific interests situated in a particular class based context. 
Similarly, the division of labor prevents individuals from living in the way they 
wish. Marx argues that “each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is 
forced upon him and from which he cannot escape… if he does not want to lose his 
livelihood (German Ideology 160).” In this way, individuals become trapped by their 
mode of production. Although they may desire to live a more dynamic and fulfilling life, 
a society characterized by the division of labor only allows humans to become 
accomplished within the narrow confines of what is delegated to them by the market and 
class position. No longer are humans able to choose for themselves what matters, and 
what is worthwhile to pursue. 
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Based on this split of material and mental labor and the division of intellectual 
production, the dominant class is able to impose their values, thereby creating a society 
that is ordered to work to their advantage. Marx argues that the elite class, which controls 
society in terms of material wealth, also controls the intellectual development of society 
(German Ideology 172). The importance of this phenomenon cannot be understated. 
Critically,  "the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to" 
the value systems put in place by the dominant class. Here, we must recognize that the 
intellectual production of the elite has the effect of supporting the dominant material 
relationships that already exist (German Ideology 173). The dominant classes ideology 
serves to justify and legitimate their position of dominance. 
What does this power look like in real life? In the context of feudalism, Marx 
argues that the value placed on “honor” and “loyalty” serves to perpetuate and justify a 
system that would be less likely to endure otherwise (German Ideology 173). However, 
typical analysis tends to neglect the context of the roots of these created values. Failing to 
recognize the way that the  position of the intellectual class informs their production leads 
to the faulty belief that their ideas are in the “common interest of all the members of 
society (German Ideology 174).” As long as class differentiation endures, the least 
advantaged will be unable to order society in accordance with what they value. 
Marx also argues that the division of labor is incompatible with the development 
of a world suitable for human life because it sets individuals at odds with the communal 
interest, while simultaneously necessitating their cooperation. According to Marx, the 
division of labor leads individuals to seek "only their particular interest, which for them 
does not coincide with their communal interest (German Ideology 161)." Not only do 
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humans prioritize their self-interest over the communal interest, but the division of labor 
even stifles our ability to identify with the communal interest. Marx makes this explicit 
when he states that communal interest "will be imposed on them as an interest "alien" to 
them, and "independent" of them (German Ideology 161)." Importantly, this dynamic 
necessitates state control over individuals to maintain order. 
Paradoxically, despite the divisiveness of the division of labor, it also makes a 
community a necessity. Unsurprisingly, because individuals no longer capable of 
producing all their material needs every individual must cooperate with others for their 
sustenance. As Marx puts it, “the individuals themselves are entirely subordinated to the 
division of labor and hence are brought into the most complete dependence on one 
another (German Ideology 190).” It is evident that, for Marx, a society that prioritizes and 
respects humans’ well being is impossible with this fundamental discord existing within 
every citizen. Recognizing our interdependence, the division of labor is incompatible 
with a society based in substantive communal cooperation. Accordingly, Marx argues 
that the division of labor must be abolished if humans hope to reach a communist utopia 
(German Ideology 197). 
Given that Marx argues that the division of labor must be abolished to advance 
the human condition, it is clear that gender also must be overcome. Gender is the 
societally and institutionally enforced construct that delegates duties, rights, privileges, 
and expectations based on biological sex assigned at birth to which an individual is 
expected to conform their actions and behaviors. My definition aims to keep in mind both 
the legal and social dynamics that entrench and build upon the biological differences 
between the sexes. Additionally, the phrase “delegates expectations, duties, rights, and 
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privileges” aims to situate my definition in the context of the discourse of distributive 
justice. 
There is no question that Marx believed gender to be an example of the 
dehumanizing practice of the division of labor. Marx states that the division of labor "was 
originally nothing but the division of labor in the sexual act (German Ideology 158).”  
After this initial division based on the act of reproduction, it follows that the subsequent 
birth of a child further entrenches the division of labor between partners within the 
traditionally gendered family (German Ideology 151). Importantly, as Marx views the 
family as the first relationship in human history, gender is fundamentally rooted in the 
division of labor. At their core, gender roles assign and enforce a conception of what 
work should be reasonably expected and required from an individual based on the sex 
they were assigned at birth. Specifically, traditional conceptions of womanhood are based 
on societally enforced domestic duties such as raising children. Importantly, unlike other 
philosophers such as John Rawls, Marx does not assume the family to be just. On the 
contrary, Marx explicitly states that within the traditionally gendered family “wife and 
children are slaves of the husband (German Ideology 159).” 
In the same way as the division of labor in general, the division of labor based on 
gender roles creates deep inequality between men and women based on unequal ability to 
create capital. In Justice, Gender, and the Family, Susan Moller Okin supports this 
position by stating that the division of labor within the family creates “economic 
dependency and restricted opportunities of most women (Okin 9).” Women's enforced 
domestic roles restrict their economic horizons given that their labor takes place outside 
of the market. This is a fundamental way in which gender leaves women with asymmetric 
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power and agency within particular relationships, as well as society as a whole. Moller 
Okin argues that marriage obscures women's disproportionate vulnerability, while at the 
same time "gender structure marriage makes women vulnerable (Okin 5)." This 
vulnerability becomes most apparent during divorce (Okin 5). Marx certainly recognizes 
the way the enforced division of unpaid domestic labor advantages men at the expense of 
women. The traditionally gendered family assumes that men have a wife at home that 
takes care of all child-rearing as well as other domestic labor. This leaves men free to 
devote their time to pursuing material wealth in a way that would not be possible if they 
had to contribute their fair share to the family. Marx calls this “the power of disposing of 
the labor power of others (Marx 159)." 
In her book Why Some Things Should Not be for Sale, Deborah Satz offers yet 
another example of how the division of labor based on gender leaves women with less 
material power than men born into the exact same situation. Like both Marx and Okin, 
Satz is clear that the traditionally gendered family cannot be assumed to be just (Satz 
158). This underlying injustice is exemplified in the case of nowhere children, who are 
forced to do unpaid domestic work instead of attending school or taking a job on the 
market (Satz 164). Nowhere children are typically women whose unpaid domestic work 
allows for her brothers to attend school without having to work (Satz 168). This is one of 
the clearest manifestations of the gendered division of labor. Critically, this example 
shows that women's domestic positions are not simply chosen by mothers after they have 
a baby. Rather, the expectation that women should provide unpaid labor at home is 
central to the traditional conception of womanhood. Satz' discussion of nowhere children 
exemplifies how gender-based expectations and duties serve the purpose of empowering 
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men through "disposing of the labor power" of women. As a result, the division of labor 
implicit in gender creates material inequality between men and women. 
Gender, perhaps more so than the division of labor in general, shapes individuals’ 
consciousness in a way that is incompatible with a society fit for human life. This social 
phenomenon is highlighted by many feminist thinkers including Susan Moller Okin and 
Jean Hampton. Specifically, gender shapes women’s thought process to be more 
collective in aim than men who typically are more individualistic. This is supported by 
Moller Okin’s statement that “the socialization and role expectations of women mean that 
they are generally more inclined than men not to claim their fair share, and more inclined 
to order their priorities in accordance with the needs of their families (Okin 31).”  While 
we often think that saying there is no difference between men and women is a nonsexist 
statement, this false neutrality fails to recognize one of the most significant effects of 
gender.  
In Feminist Contractarianism, Jean Hampton cites a study by Carol Gilligan that 
concluded that gender creates distinct “interests,” like the division of labor. Hampton 
uses the example of Jack and Amy to illuminate the way in which society creates distinct 
ways of thinking for men and women from the time that they are children (Hampton 
231). Jack’s response to the question of balancing “responsibility to oneself and 
responsibility to others” prioritizes self-interest (Hampton 228). On the other hand, 
Amy’s response shows much more deference to the needs of others. However, while this 
may seem preferable, Amy’s answer fails to put much weight on her own desires 
(Hampton 230). Unlike Jack, she is not as confident about the value of her interests. 
These two contrasting responses signify two separate, gendered ways of constructing 
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morality (Hampton 229). Hampton makes clear her support for the idea that gender 
influences our self-conceptions of morality stating that the children’s respective answers 
serve to justify their future roles as dominant/subservient (Hampton 231). Clearly, like 
the division of labor in general, gender shapes the way individuals conceive of their 
interests. Moreover, gender justifies and perpetuates the unequal distribution of material 
power between men and women. 
As Marx describes regarding the division of labor, the ruling class (in the context 
of gender, men) controls intellectual production within society. Susan Moller Okin and 
Jean Hampton both highlight the historical lack of representation of women in the field of 
political theory (Hampton 227, Okin 8). Unsurprisingly, male-centric theories of justice 
typically fail to critically engage with the question of whether gender and the traditionally 
structured family can possibly be just. For example, Susan Moller Okin critiques John 
Rawls' theory of justice on the basis that it leaves the family outside the scope of justice, 
thereby falling into the "public domestic dichotomy (Okin 92)."  By permitting the 
traditionally gendered family, we can be certain that an ideal Rawlsian society would still 
be plagued by sexism. 
Perhaps more importantly, male domination of intellectual production has the 
effect of ordering society in a way that is unresponsive to the needs of women and 
undervalues the roles into which they are coerced by gender. In his work, In Defense of 
Genderlessness, Erik Olin Wright describes a phenomenon called the care penalty (Olin 
Wright). Wright begins by establishing the fact that gender influences women to enter 
into certain fields. Specifically, the socially exaggerated stereotype that women have a 
greater propensity for nurturing behavior than men has the effect of causing careers in 
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care work to be disproportionately occupied by women  (Olin Wright). These careers 
tend to be severely underpaid as compared to their importance. Wright argues that this is 
in large part because of the “cultural value,” or rather the lack thereof, placed on care 
work (Olin Wright). The devaluing of this work is directly tied to misogynistic 
philosophical constructions of the importance and value of different types of work. If the 
division of labor had not excluded women from the intellectual production of establishing 
the “cultural value” of different jobs, it is unlikely that care work would be seen as less 
valuable than other forms of labor. With this in mind, it is clear that the gendered division 
of labor, and the consequent limitations placed on who could engage in intellectual 
production, has ordered society in a way that disadvantages women and devalues their 
contributions. Clearly, in order to advance the human condition, more and more women 
must engage in the work of intellectual production. In order for this to be realized, 
gender, and its implied division of labor must be abolished.  
Gender, in the same way as the division of labor, sets individual interest and 
communal interest in opposition. Surely, the general interest cannot be interpreted to 
enforce the servility of half of the population. In On the Jewish Question, Marx goes into 
greater depth regarding the need for all humans to meaningfully internalize the communal 
interest as inseparable from their own. This idealized human is referred to as a "species 
being in contrast to "egoistic man (Jewish Question 43)." Overall, this process is called 
human emancipation, which I will focus on in greater depth in the next section. Gender, 
because of the way it creates a distinct egoistic psychology in men, stands in the way of a 
society occupied by species-beings. For now, I will delay my analysis to more fully 
explain the concept of human emancipation and its relation to gender. 
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In summation, the dismantling of gender is implied and required to reach Marx’s 
ideal society, which requires the abolition of the division of labor.  Firstly, gender by its 
very nature implies the division of labor. Marx recognizes this fact in his analysis stating 
that, during tribal ownership, the division of labor grows within the family starting with 
reproduction (German Ideology 151). As Marx observes of the division of labor in 
general, the gendered division of domestic labor leads to an unequal distribution of 
power, autonomy, and capital. Once again mirroring the broader division of labor, gender 
creates distinct interests for men and women that serve to reinforce relationships of 
dominance. On top of this, the dominant gender, as with class, gains the ability to control 
intellectual production. Therefore, gender is one particularly pervasive example of the 
division of labor. Accordingly, true abolition of the division of labor requires dismantling 
gender, as gender implies and perpetuates a division of labor founded within the family 
that now extends far beyond the household. 
Beyond the call to abolish gender implicit in Marx’s critique of the division of 
labor, his writings in On the Jewish Question suggest that, like religion, gender abolition 
is necessary for human emancipation. In On the Jewish Question, Marx differentiates 
between political emancipation and human emancipation. Currently, Marx would accept 
that we live in a politically emancipated society, yet he would be disgusted to see how far 
we are from true human emancipation. According to Marx, human emancipation is 
incompatible with divisive social constructs such as religion. These institutions require 
abolition to attain human emancipation as they perpetuate a wide array of divisive 




Marx defines political emancipation in opposition to the feudal order. Marx 
argues that under feudalism, the whole of an individual's identity was politicized in order 
to determine political rights and status (Jewish Question 44). Critically, the feudal order 
limited the right to political action to the “ruler and his servants (Jewish Question 45).” 
Understanding this historical context, political emancipation as defined by Marx is best 
understood as the separation of the right to participate in politics from social status of an 
individual within civil society. In principle, political emancipation simply delegated equal 
rights under the law to all citizens, regardless of their class position or identity (Jewish 
Question 45). After the political revolution, restrictions on political participation based on 
culturally defined criteria, such as religion, occupation, and gender, are removed. Instead, 
politics became a “matter of general concern” for every citizen (Jewish Question 45). 
However, Marx argues the state of political emancipation is far from perfect and 
creates unique problems apart from those present in feudal society. By making "public 
affairs...the general affair of each individual," politics is reduced to a stage for the 
competing interests of every egoistic individual within the state (Jewish Question 45). 
Underlying this problematic phenomenon is the creation of a dichotomy between the 
political community and civil society, which creates within each human a sort of dual 
consciousness of citizen and private individual  (Jewish Question 34). Marx's idealized 
political citizen, or species being, is capable of thinking in terms of the genuine interests 
of society as a whole (Jewish Question 43). In contrast, the "egoistic man" that is found 
within civil society thinks only in terms of self-interest. This point is made clear when 
Marx states, "the only bond between men is natural necessity, need and private interest, 
the preservation of their property and their egoistic persons (Jewish Question 43). Thus, 
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political emancipation removed from humans, in their practical form, any sense of a 
"general good (Jewish Question 45)." Given that Marx acknowledges that political 
emancipation made egoistic man the "foundation and presupposition of the political 
state," politics at this stage does not aim to achieve the ideal of species life. 
Moreover, Marx argues that in a politically emancipated state, all the divisive and 
destructive elements that prevent human liberation are still present within civil society 
(Jewish Question 34). Under political emancipation, characteristics that once determined 
an individual's relation to the state are not abolished. Rather, these characteristics such as 
religion, property, and gender continue to exist in significant ways within civil society 
(Jewish Question 46). In fact, as exemplified in North America, the region Marx 
considered to have attained the highest degree of political emancipation, religion's 
separation from the realm of politics did nothing to diminish its influence (Jewish 
Question 31). Critically, Marx states, "the political revolution dissolves civil society into 
its elements without revolutionizing these elements themselves or subjecting them to 
criticism (Jewish Question 46)." The effect of this is freedom under the law without true 
freedom for the conditions of humans on the ground. As Marx put it, "a state may be a 
free state without man himself being a free man (Jewish Question 32)." 
On the other hand, Marx argues that human emancipation is achieved when 
humans live as species-beings, as opposed to self-interested individuals. With regard to 
politics, human emancipation is achieved when every individual internalizes the 
mentality of the "abstract citizen (Jewish Question 46)." Here, Marx invokes Rousseau, 
arguing that human emancipation occurs when individuals recognize, fully accept, and 
operate as if they are "a part of something greater than [themselves] (Jewish Question 
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46)."  Within a society elevated to the status of human emancipation, every individual is a 
species-being. This means that within every individual there is universal recognition of 
the fact that every other member of society is equally valuable and deserving of respect 
(Jewish Question 34). 
Achieving human emancipation requires the dissolution of constructs that divide 
society and encourage individuals to operate from a position of self-interest. As we have 
seen, during political emancipation, all of the components of civil society continue to 
influence humans' relations to one another. Moreover, during political emancipation, 
these divisive characteristics are left in place without any substantial critique. So long as 
these divisive features are left in place, humans cannot interact as equals. While in On the 
Jewish Question Marx primarily considers religions compatibility with human 
emancipation, any cultural practice that divides and perpetuates humans' egoistic, insular 
nature, is antithetical to this end. Clearly, religion is not the only institution that has to be 
dismantled during human emancipation. Any institution that creates a class of exclusively 
self-interested individuals is against the aim of human emancipation. Here, I argue that 
gender is exactly the type of social construction that must be overcome in order to 
achieve human emancipation. 
Currently, the status of women in the US most closely resembles political 
emancipation. Although women have an equal right to political participation and 
protection under the law, we still live in a deeply gendered society. While gender does 
not entirely define an individual's relationship with the state, it’s enduring significance 
within civil society largely mirrors Marx's observation regarding the prominence of 
religion with the United States despite political emancipation. Because gender continues 
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to function within civil society, humans are fundamentally still bound by the societal 
expectations attached to gender, which has the effect of limiting their freedom to define 
and choose what their life will be. Despite the fact that political participation is not tied to 
gender, we still live in a deeply sexist society. Clearly, political emancipation does 
relatively little to address the issue of gender inequality. 
So long as gender exists, human emancipation will be incomplete as gender is 
antithetical to the concept of species-beings. As previously noted, the socially enforced 
expectations and duties tied to gender, which are placed upon individuals from early 
childhood, create distinct psychologies between men and women. Recall the study by 
Carol Gilligan referenced by Jean Hampton in Feminist Contractarianism. Hampton 
specifically references two responses to the question of how to balance self-interest and 
responsibility to others (Hampton 228). Here, it is worth noting that this question is 
central to what it means to be a species-being. While we cannot be certain exactly what 
Marx would say, we can be fairly sure that the appropriate response would not unduly 
prioritize individual interests at the expense of communal wellbeing. Human 
emancipation requires that individuals do not act only out of self-interest, but instead 
view themselves as a part of a larger collective that must be taken into account during any 
decision making. 
With this in mind, Hampton's analysis of Carol Gilligan's study suggests that 
distinct psychologies between men and women created socially through gender norms 
cannot exist under human emancipation. Specifically, the male perspective as 
exemplified by Jack's response fits neatly with Marx's critique of the egoism that exists 
within individuals in a politically emancipated society. Most immediately, Jack's 
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response is problematic because he affords his interest three times the weight as other 
individuals (Hampton 228). The egoism present in Jack's archetypically male response is 
exemplified in the statement that, "the most important thing in your decision should be 
yourself (Hampton 228)." Critically absent from Jack's response as compared to Amy's is 
any deference to the "needs of others (Hampton 229)."  This type of statement 
exemplifies the type of thinking that Marx believed prevented individuals from inhabiting 
a world of human emancipation. 
Hampton goes on to point out that the two responses reflect "the voice of a child 
who is preparing to be a member of a dominating group and the voice of another who is 
preparing to be a member of the group that is dominated (Hampton 231)." Here, 
Hampton makes clear that the differences between Jack and Amy's responses are 
fundamentally tied to their gender. Fundamentally, gender enforces behavioral 
expectations and duties that shape how individuals view the world and their place within 
it. More specifically, gender creates different ways of thinking between men and women 
that work to legitimate, and at the same time are byproducts of, their relative positions of 
dominance and subservience. As Hampton posits, gender creates within men an egoistic 
psychology of entitlement. This way of thinking, as exemplified by Jack, is incompatible 
with the ideal of human emancipation based on individuals' development into species-
beings. For this reason, gender abolition is necessary to attain the ideal of human 
emancipation. 
On top of this reason, political emancipation on the basis of gender fails to 
question whether gender is compatible with a society fit for human life. As Erik Olin 
Wright points out, the idea of a society with gender equality is an "oxymoron" (Olin 
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Wright). Inherently, the socially enforced behavioral norms, duties, and privileges that 
define gender materially restrict the paths in life an individual can choose without 
suffering social repercussions (Olin Wright). As Wright explains, "gender norms impose 
real costs on people who violate those norms and this restricts access to the social means 
for a flourishing life for people whose gender-linked dispositions do not correspond to 
those normative expectations (Olin Wright)." Therefore, as Wright reasons, even if all 
differences in power and wealth attached to gender are removed, the fact that deviation 
from accepted gender roles is stigmatized and discouraged means that gender still stands 
in the way of individuals pursuing their most fulfilling life. In this way, political 
emancipation still leaves women within an oppressive system given that, within civil 
society, operates to restrict women's actions. Moreover, attempts at remedying the 
inequality implicit in gender are ineffective as long as the expectations and duties that 
define gender endure. With this in mind, given that gender dramatically restricts an 
individual's capacity to achieve a "flourishing life," reaching human emancipation 
requires a genderless society. If not, then we must question whether a society 
characterized by human emancipation is even truly fit for human life. 
One may argue that it is possible to achieve equality without dismantling gender 
through policies that dismantle the barriers faced by women to achieve material success. 
An adherent of this perspective may contend that it is possible to dismantle the power 
imbalance between men and women without totally abandoning the gendered identities of 
men and women. This perspective mainly takes issue with the premise that gender is 
inseparably connected to the gendered division of labor, and subsequently duties and 
behavioral expectations. Importantly, this objection does not imply that gender has not 
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been constructed in a deeply unequal way that advantages men at the expense of women. 
Erik Olin Wright identifies this perspective as gender egalitarianism (Olin Wright). 
Wright argues that, like class, gender at its core implies inequality (Olin Wright). 
Recall our previously established definition of gender. How can biological sex, a morally 
arbitrary characteristic that one cannot deserve, be used to determine the distribution of 
power, rights, and duties in a society committed to respecting human dignity? I argue that 
just as there cannot be a society with class distinction that is truly equal, neither can there 
be a society with the concept of gender in which the material prospects of men and 
women are indistinguishable (Olin Wright). Here, one can certainly object from a 
Rawlsian perspective that inequality may be permissible if it is to the benefit of the least 
advantaged. However, I maintain that ideal, Rawlsian society would still be characterized 
by class distinction and inequality. This does not mean that equality is an unworthy goal. 
Often, gender abolition is strawmanned as requiring that "everyone would be 
androgynous in their identities and practices (Olin Wright).” In reality, gender abolition is 
the process of moving towards a society in which rights and duties are not distributed on 
the basis of biological sex.  
In this way, policies that advance equality between men and women directly 
undermine the foundations of the institution of gender (Olin Wright). For example, 
Wright argues that policies that work to promote equal participation in raising children 
degenders the character of domestic labor (Olin Wright). This is particularly important 
considering the way in which unpaid domestic labor has historically prevented women 
from being able to participate within the workforce in the same way as men. By 
promoting equal participation between partners in child rearing, whether one is born with 
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the ability to produce a child has a significantly reduced impact on the expectations 
surrounding the proper balance between labor at home or on the market. Importantly, 
gendered behavioral expectations will continue to inhibit women's ability to lead a 
satisfying and fulfilling life even if economic discrimination rooted out by policies 
promoting gender equality (Olin Wright). For this reason, it is important that we strive 
not only to dismantle the unequal distribution of material wealth, but also the system of 
expectations attached to gender that unfairly define what constitutes a proper life for an 
individual based on sex (Olin Wright). Detaching biological sex from the distribution of 
rights, duties, and expectations is literally the act of transcending past gender. 
With this in mind, the idea that gender can endure while men and women interact 
as equals is deeply flawed. While the goal of gender egalitarians is in line with that of 
gender abolitionists, they fail to recognize that gender is fundamentally incompatible with 
a nonsexist society. Humans cannot interact equally as long as gender continues to define 
our development. Gender is constructed in a way that constrains what life is normatively 
appropriate for an individual to pursue in a way that undermines men and women’s 
ability to interact as free and equal moral persons. Therefore, gender egalitarians favored 
policies would actually work to degender society, as they would erode the linkage 
between biological sex and a defined mold of how to occupy the world properly. 
Understanding this, the idea that we can achieve equality while maintaining gender is 
absurd. In fact, every move towards equality slowly dismantles gender as constructed.  
    Without once commenting on the concept we understand today to be gender, in 
On the Jewish Question and The German Ideology Karl Marx offers us a powerful, 
genderless vision of what the future of humanity could be. In The German Ideology, 
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Marx calls for the abolition of the division of labor based on the way in which it 
inevitably creates deep economic, social and intellectual inequality. Critically, Marx 
points out that the division of labor has its origins within the family, an institution that 
cannot be assumed to be just. What Marx is referring to here is gender, which 
normatively establishes expectations of duty and behavior on the basis of biological sex. 
As I argue, gender functions in the same dehumanizing way as the division of labor as a 
whole. Therefore, the division of labor cannot truly be abolished without dismantling the 
concept of gender, which inherently defines a socially coercive division of labor between 
men and women.  
The idea of Marx supporting gender abolition is not only found in The German 
Ideology. In On the Jewish Question, Marx puts forward a concept called human 
emancipation, which is a step beyond human emancipation in the course of human 
development. Human emancipation requires that all individuals transcend divisive social 
constructs and become species-beings who are capable of genuine communal thinking. 
While this piece describes the reasons why religion must be abolished, gender functions 
in very much the same way. The way that gender influences individuals thinking to 
maintain relationships of servility would prevent humans from becoming species-beings.  
The process of dismantling gender is far less radical and abstract than it sounds. 
As Erik Olin Wright puts it, "degendering would be a side effect of the pursuit of gender 
equality (Olin Wright)." Clearly, many of our current policies that seek to combat sexism 
are already working to create a more genderless society. Additionally, increasing 
acceptance of gender fluidity exemplifies the way in which society at large is moving 
towards a more genderless collective consciousness. On the surface, it may seem that 
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gender fluidity still reaffirms the existence of gender. However, the idea that an 
individual can detach their gender from their biological sex is deeply liberating. While 
gender abolition may sound like a far fetched ideal born out of a culture of political 
correctness that is often vilified as ridiculous, it seems that we are already moving 





















CHAPTER 4: Sen 
In this chapter, I focus on a different vision for human advancement. Namely, 
Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom. I begin by reconstructing Sen’s argument with 
particular attention to the “process” and “opportunity” aspect of freedom. These two 
concepts map cleanly onto the “effectiveness” and “evaluative” reasons for the promotion 
of freedom. Based on this understanding of freedom, I point out that full realization of 
Sen’s vision for human development requires the elimination of forms of unfreedom. I 
then establish that gender would qualify as a form of unfreedom according to Sen’s 
definition. In this way, we again find in Development as Freedom an implicit argument 
for gender abolition, given that, if gender ceased to be a form of unfreedom it would no 
longer be recognizable as gender. I also demonstrate that promoting women’s agency 
does not only benefit women, but also uplifts others. This is what is referred to as the 
effectiveness reason, and lends support to the idea that gender is a form of unfreedom in 
an of itself  
 
RECONSTRUCTION OF SEN’S ARGUMENT 
 
As the title cleanly sums up, the foundation of Amartya Sen’s Development as 
Freedom is the idea that development should be understood as the process of increasing 
the degree of “real freedom” that individuals enjoy within a particular society (Sen 3). To 
say that a society is developing, according to Sen’s definition, has less to do with 
economic growth and more to do with the increasing presence of substantive freedom. 
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According to this understanding, a poorer society may have achieved a higher level of 
development if their citizens' lives are characterized by a more comprehensive set of 
freedoms as compared to their relatively more wealthy counterparts. This more complete, 
holistic way of conceptualizing development stands in stark contrast to more traditional 
notions of development that tie development to factors such as “growth of gross national 
product...rise in personal incomes,... industrialization,... technological advance, or with 
social modernization (Sen 3).”   
 Having addressed Sen’s conception of development, the question arises: what 
exactly does Sen mean by “freedom?” Sen argues that freedom consists of both a 
“process aspect” and an “opportunity aspect (Sen 17).” By “process,” Sen is referring to 
the presence of individual agency in “actions and decisions (Sen 17).” This type of 
freedom is exemplified by “political and civil rights” such as the ability to vote or to 
freely enter into contracts and more broadly to choose what ends one wishes to pursue 
(Sen 17). Additionally, the process aspect also refers to the ability to exercise autonomy 
in civil society. This is what Sen refers to as “social choice (Sen 291) ” However, as Sen 
points out, the procedural aspect is not sufficiently broad to encompass freedom on its 
own. Instead, we must also consider “opportunity,” which refers to the material 
conditions individuals exist within such as the presence of poverty and mortality (Sen 
17). The opportunity aspect of freedom also refers to individuals abilities to achieve the 
outcomes that they desire. These two aspects make clear that Sen’s definition of freedom 
does not simply mean survival, but is also connected to Aristotilian notions of human 
“flourishing,” as well as  “capacity (Sen 24).”  
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 Sen also distinguishes between the “constitutive and instrumental roles of 
freedom (Sen 36).” While his primary focus is the instrumental role, Sen regards the 
constitutive role as framing freedom as the “primary end” of development (Sen 36). Put 
simply, freedom is a worthy goal because it leaves humans better off than they would be 
in its absence. In its constitutive role, freedom represents the “removal” of “deprivations” 
such as hunger, violence, and political unfreedom (Sen 37). The removal of these 
deprivations constitute the promotion of freedom. On the other hand, the instrumental 
role of freedom views freedom as “the principle means of development (Sen 36).” While 
it may seem self evident that if freedom is the end of development then it must also be a 
part of the means, Sen focuses on freedom as an instrument in order to effectively 
illustrate that seemingly unrelated kinds of freedom are actually intimately connected 
(Sen 37). For example, as Sen points out the fact that there has never been a famine 
within a functioning democracy is evidence that political freedom helps secure the 
freedom from starvation, even though these may seem unrelated (Sen 51). This 
perspective informs Sen’s more broad statement that “free and sustainable agency [is]... a 
major engine of development (Sen 4).” 
Closely related to these two roles of freedom are Sen’s two main reasons to value 
freedom in promoting development. He distinguishes between the two as the “evaluative” 
and “effectiveness” reasons (Sen, 4). Sen defines the evaluative reason as, “assessment of 
progress has to be done primarily in terms of whether the freedoms that people have are 
enhanced (Sen 4). More importantly, central to Sen’s argument is the idea that advances 
in individuals’ material freedoms in certain areas of life promote the development of 
greater freedoms in seemingly unrelated domains (Sen 4). In this way, actions that 
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enhance a particular group's freedom as an agent simultaneously engender advances in 
human freedom generally. This is what Sen refers to as the “effectiveness reason (Sen, 
4).” In this way, the effectiveness reason for promoting freedom is linked to the 
instrumental role of freedom. Similarly, the evaluative reason for promoting reason, 
which holds that “assessment of progress has to be done primarily in terms of whether the 
freedoms that people have are enhanced,” is inseparable from the constitutive role of 
freedom (Sen 4).  
Sen then shifts his focus to five different categories of instrumental freedoms, “ 
(1)political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, (3) social opportunities, (4) transparency 
guarantees and (5) protective security (Sen 10).” While these freedoms are all worthy 
ends on their own given the constitutive role, Sen argues that these five freedoms are also 
critical in promoting development (Sen 38). To briefly touch on the meanings of these 
separate categories, political freedom encompasses concepts such as democracy broadly, 
as well as civil rights, lack of censorship, and the ability to dissent (Sen 28). Economic 
facilities refers to individuals ability to “utilize economic resources for the purpose of 
consumption, or production, or exchange (Sen 39).” Critically, this freedom also 
demands that national economic growth is not limited to only a particular class, so 
distributive justice is central to the fulfillment of this instrumental freedom (Sen 39). 
Social opportunities comprises the institutions within a society that facilitate a flourishing 
life, both mentally and physically, such as health care and education to name two formal 
institutions (Sen 39). Next, transparency guarantees are meant to protect against 
corruption and predatory economic practices through securing “guarantees of disclosure 
and lucidity” between individuals (Sen 39-40). Lastly, protective security refers to the 
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presence of institutional arrangements that are intended to ensure the survival of the most 
vulnerable members of society such as the poor, unemployed, disabled, elderly, as well as 
the victims of natural disasters (Sen 40).  
While Sen is correct in pointing out that freedom may frequently be correlated 
with these factors, there are also cases where the promotion of freedom comes into 
conflict with these specific measures (Sen 3). Hypothetically, consider an authoritarian 
government where utilizing central planning has caused widespread poverty (just an 
example). In this context, deregulation of the labor market could enhance the freedom 
citizens enjoy by allowing greater agency for individuals to pursue whatever they define 
for themselves as fulfilling work. Additionally, it is possible that deregulation could uplift 
the country economically thereby alleviating the unfreedoms that accompany poverty. 
However, in the United States, deregulation of the labor market could leave people less 
free by eliminating protections/benefits such as minimum wage, health insurance, as well 
as parental leave. 
 It is with this basis that Sen implores us to always remember that freedom is the 
proper end of development, and not to get fixated or overly attached to “particular means, 
or some specially chosen list of instruments (Sen 3).” That is to say, we should focus on 
promoting freedom directly rather than indirectly. We must recognize that the means we 
use to achieve this end may vary depending on context. For example, while in some cases 
the promotion of free markets may lead to greater overall freedom this does not 
necessarily mean that the maintenance of markets absent governmental regulation should 
be what we strive for. Free markets are only a worthy aim insofar as they advance the 
more important end of promoting individuals’ substantive freedom (Sen 6). With this 
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being said, Sen acknowledges that “freedoms are not only the primary ends of 
development, they are also among its principal means (Sen 11).” I only use free markets 
as an example, the larger point is, in Sen’s eyes, we are only developing if we are 
increasing freedom, regardless of the means or institutional arrangements that get us to 
that point. 
 With this background, it is evident that Sen’s assertion that “development requires 
the removal of major sources of unfreedom” flows logically from his definitions of 
development and freedom (Sen 3). On the most fundamental level, unfreedom can take 
the form of existential threats such as hunger, violence, as well as the lack of healthcare, 
sanitation, and clean water (Sen 15). These types of unfreedom are not limited to only 
poor nations. As Sen highlights, “Even within very rich countries, sometimes the 
longevity of substantial groups is no higher than that in much poorer economies of the so-
called third world (Sen 15).” Importantly, Sen recognizes that gender is one form of 
unfreedom that can also qualify as an existential threat to women’s lives through violence 
as well as restriction of substantive freedom (Sen 15). 
 Beyond these forms, Sen also focuses on the abridgement of political and civil 
rights as unfreedom, which he argues can be a major cause of economic insecurity (Sen 
16). Sen also includes factors like “systematic social deprivation, neglect of public 
facilities as well as intolerance (Sen 3).” However, one factor I feel he fails to adequately 
address is unfreedom institutionalized within our interpersonal relationships, like gender 
(perhaps this would fall under systematic social deprivation). Regardless of whether Sen 
has named every type of unfreedom (which is not a particularly realistic expectation), the 
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main takeaway here should be the idea that if an unfreedom exists, then development 
requires that it be dismantled.  
 This brings me to my argument concerning gender and its incompatibility with 
Sen’s conception of development. If we understand development as promoting freedom, 
then the most developed society would be the one that has achieved freedom to the 
highest degree. In order to realize this objective, Sen makes clear that we must dismantle 
the sources of unfreedom that stand in the way of development. In the paragraphs that 
follow, I intend to demonstrate that gender as I have defined for the purposes of this 
thesis constitutes a major source of unfreedom. For this reason, Sen’s framework would 
require that we dismantle the aspects of gender that qualify as forms of unfreedom if we 
intend on maximizing human development. However, given that these unfreedoms are 
exactly what defines gender, the process of development is also a process of 
dismantling/abolishing gender. Any move towards development as freedom with respect 
to gender erodes the patriarchal construction of gender. Theoretically, if a society was to 
fully achieve the end of development, this society would neccessarily be genderless 
according to the definition of gender put forward in my first chapter. Therefore, implicit 
in Sen’s Development as Freedom is a powerful argument for the dismantling/abolition 
of gender. 
 
GENDER AS UNFREEDOM: OPPORTUNITY ASPECT 
 
 In establishing gender as a form of unfreedom I want to first examine genders’ 
relationship to the opportunity aspect of freedom. Sen defines this component as 
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individuals “opportunity to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to value 
(Sen 291).” Sen ties this aspect of freedom to both health and safety, as well as economic 
outcomes (Sen 17, 291). In the following paragraphs, I will make clear the ways in which 
gender is a major source of unfreedom as it relates to Sen’s opportunity aspect. 
Specifically, I will focus on the way in which gender’s delegation of unpaid domestic 
labor to women stands in the way of women achieving the same economic outcomes as 
men. In this way, gender is an obstacle to the realization of the opportunity aspect of 
freedom. 
As I mentioned before, Oyèrónkẹ Oyèwùmí observes in Visualising the Body, the 
fact that gender is a social construction means that there must be variation depending on 
context (time and place), given that not every society is constructed identically 
(Oyèwùmí 464). However, despite Oyèwùmí’s contention that gender cannot then be 
uniform across all societies, I, along with other significant feminist thinkers, still hold 
that gender has several central features that vary in degree but are still present across all 
patriarchal societies (Oyèwùmí 462-464). As Awa Thiam observes in Feminism and 
Revolution, the delegation of domestic duties to women is one of the most prominent 
features of gender that cuts across cultures (Thiam 119). Thiam points out that the 
delegation of unpaid domestic duty that defines gender within patriarchal societies leaves 
women unfree relative to men (Thiam 119). As I have previously mentioned, this idea is 
central to much of contemporary feminist theory.  
Here, I argue that gender’s inherent delegation of the burden of domesticity to 
women limits their ability to achieve the outcomes that they desire relative to men. One 
major reason for this is the fact that women’s labor within the household is typically 
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uncompensated, yet assumed and enforced. Conversely, the expectation and duty that 
men should participate in the formal labor market positions men advantageously to 
pursue and achieve whatever ends they define as worthy.  Interestingly, the main 
contention of Thiam’s paper is the idea that full liberation for colonized people requires 
the liberation of women, which in turn requires a “sexual revolution (Thiam 116).” This 
effectively mirrors my argument in this chapter that in order to achieve Sen’s definition 
of development to the greatest degree, gender must be abolished/dismantled.   
First, let us consider the way in which the burden of unpaid domestic labor 
inhibits the opportunity aspect of freedom for women. At the most basic level, the 
traditionally gendered family’s main assumption is that the wife/mother stays at home 
and does domestic labor while the husband/father works in the labor market (Okin 5). On 
the most basic level, it is apparent that when the family is ordered in this way women are 
isolated from the formalized economy, and are therefore less able to make money. Given 
Sen’s recognition that, although wealth cannot properly be an end in itself (having only 
instrumental value), it is extremely useful in helping people achieve “freedom to lead the 
kind of lives we have reason to value (Sen 14). Logically, it would follow that the 
unequal distribution of wealth caused by gender as traditionally constructed leaves 
women with diminished means to pursue the opportunities they value relative to men. For 
this reason, when the family is structured in this way, women have less freedom in 
achieving desired outcomes, which inhibits the opportunity aspect of freedom 
Even today as women increasingly participate in wage labor outside of the 
household, the assumptions regarding the division of labor within the household implied 
by the traditionally gendered family still hold incredible weight. Here, the burden of 
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gender’s inherent delegation of domestic duty to women allows less freedom relative to 
men in achieving valued outcomes, both professionally and socially/privately. For 
example, Susan Moller Okin states that within “households with two full-time working 
parents,”  the mother often “does, at the very least, twice as much family work as the 
father (Okin 22).” Despite the fact that Okin made this assertion over 30 years ago, 
analysis of the American Time Usage Survey published by the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics suggests that very little progress has been made (ATUS). In other words, this 
component of the patriarchal construction of gender has remained constant. According to 
Data from 2015-2019, in families with two full time working parents women spend 
around 45 minutes on housework a day compared to 15 minutes for men (ATUS 7a). 
Interestingly, the data set is broken down into three categories: both spouses work full 
time, mother employed part time and father employed full time and mother not employed 
and father employed full time (ATUS 7a). Notably absent is the possibility that the father 
works part time or only the mother is employed. If not for gender, these would be equally 
likely possibilities. 
 This unequal distribution of domestic labor within families with two working 
parents restricts women’s ability to pursue their own professional goals to the same 
extent that men gain, while still having time for necessary leisure. On average, within 
families with two parents working full time, men have 3.6 hours of leisure time per day 
compared to 2.86 for women (ATUS 7a). This issue is compounded by the fact that the 
ordering of the modern workplace assumes that employees are part of a traditionally 
gendered family. To tie these two ideas together, not only does the unequal distribution of 
domestic labor within the family make it difficult for women to participate in the labor 
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market in the same extent as men, but the patriarchal ordering of the workplace ignores 
this burden while simultaneously undervaluing women’s work.   
Looking first at the way the unequal distribution of domestic labor affects 
women’s ability to achieve their desired professional goals, Susan Moller Okin points out 
that “employed wives still do by far the greatest proportion of unpaid family work (Okin 
5).” This is an obstacle to women’s economic and professional advancement. For 
instance, Okin reminds us that women are more likely to sacrifice their professional 
commitments in order to fulfill their enforced domestic duties than men (Okin 5). This 
contributes to the overall reality that women “advance more slowly than their husbands at 
work and thus gain less seniority (Okin 5).” Because the delegation of domestic labor is a 
constitutive part of gender, this reality is best understood as a direct consequence of 
gender. This observation is supported by Adrienne Martin who states, “meeting 
expectations of domesticity reduces women’s ability to pursue, occupy, and succeed in 
more highly valued social roles, especially those that directly affect the distribution of 
social goods (Martin 12).” Similarly, women, more often than men, tend to sacrifice their 
own careers to accommodate the professional opportunities of their husbands as is the 
case when families move for new jobs. Considering inextricable connection between 
these dynamics and gender, it is clear gender is an impediment to working 
mothers/wives’ professional advancement, and therefore inhibits the opportunity aspect 
of freedom for women.  
Another example of this dynamic is exemplified by the consequences of parental 
leave and the unequal distribution of child rearing duties. First of all, it is important to 
point out that parental leave in the United States is conceived of in a deeply gendered 
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manner. However, this is not the case to the same degree in Nordic countries with 
significant protections for paternity leave such as Finland (Haataja 2009). Beyond the 
delegation of domestic duty that I have focused upon at length, the linkage of biological 
sex and gender is used to supports the unjust idea that maternity leave is far more 
important than paternity leave, even in Nordic countries (Okin 36). For example, Allan 
Bloom states that paternity leave is "contrived and somewhat ridiculous," arguing that 
women’s biological capacity for breastfeeding justifies the pattern that working mother’s 
take time off work to care for newborns rather than fathers alone or both parents (Okin 
36). The underlying implication of this idea is that by virtue of biology, women have 
distinct normative expectations relative to men. This is the very notion of gender that my 
definition aims to reflect.  
The expectation that, within a family with two wage earning parents, women will 
take maternity leave while men will continue working prevents the equal achievement of 
desired professional outcomes between the genders. Let us consider Okin’s example of 
top law firms (Okin 126). Women who want to maximize their professional achievement 
and make partner must sacrifice having children or risk being placed on the “mommy 
track (Okin 126).”  This leaves women within these law firms with a choice between 
having a family and pursuing their career goals (Okin 126). However, men need not 
sacrifice their professional careers to have children. As Okin points out, plenty of high 
level male lawyers have children. The difference is, there is no expectation that they will 
hurt the firm by taking time off for the birth of a child (Okin 126).  Here, we clearly see 
the way in which women’s delegated domestic duties stand in the way of the opportunity 
to achieve valued outcomes, and thus the opportunity aspect of freedom. Because this 
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expectation is inherent to gender (domestic duty justified through biological appeal 
linking sex and gender) it is clear that the opportunity aspect of freedom is diminished for 
women by virtue of their gender. In order to fully realize the opportunity aspect of 
freedom, gender as presently constructed must be dismantled.  
As I mentioned in my first chapter, the centrality of the traditional division of 
labor within the family to the construction of gender means that even women without 
children are still subject to these same assumptions. This is the result of the patriarchal 
manner with which the modern workplace is ordered, as well as the individual biases 
against women. The modern workplace is ordered in a way that assumes each worker is a 
member of a traditionally gendered family. For example, the schedule of the work day 
makes it difficult to maintain a home and/or raise children (Okin 155). Okin points to the 
“vast discrepancy between normal full-time working hours and children's school hours 
and vacations,” as well as travel demands required by many jobs as evidence (Okin 155-
156). On the surface, this may seem only relevant to working mothers. However, women 
without children may still be passed over for job opportunities because employers are 
worried that their potential to become a mother will interfere with their work. Critically, 
this does not apply to men as gender does not assume that men will prioritize their 
domestic responsibilities over work, this is expected only for women. In this way, sexist 
employers may see hiring a childless woman as a greater risk than hiring a childless man. 
This is one example of the way that the expectations associated with motherhood are 
connected to  gender generally, not just the experiences of mothers. 
Perhaps more importantly, as I mention in my first chapter, because gender is 
something that is continually enforced and taught from birth through adulthood, the 
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effects of the assumption of the traditionally gendered family are felt before women 
choose whether or not to have children. Regardless of whether a woman chooses to 
become a parent, the force of gender raises women with the normative assumption that 
they should one day become mothers, which shapes how people think. This is 
exemplified in the reality that “occupational aspirations and expectations of adolescents 
are highly differentiated by sex . . . [and this] differentiation follows the pattern of sexual 
segregation which exists in the occupational structure (Okin 141-142)." Tangibly, this 
amounts to women being taught from a young age to have more modest professional 
ambitions in which they have less confidence as compared to young men (Okin 142). 
This largely stems from the fact that gender ascribes motherhood as a more proper life for 
women as opposed to professional achievement (Okin 142). Here, it is evident that the 
burden of motherhood is very influential in the development of young women who may 
never become mothers. 
The astounding extent of this gendered assumption is revealed in the 
Grandmother hypothesis, which suggests that women have evolved to live longer than 
men because of the role of grandmothers in the raising of children (Lambert 2019). Based 
on data from colonial Quebec, researchers observed that adult daughters' proximity to 
their mothers was correlated with substantially increased family size (Lambert 2019). 
Although 400 year data from Canada might seem irrelevant, we must remember that at 
the time “about half of a woman's offspring died before age 15. Such harsh conditions led 
to a range of reproductive success (Lambert 2019).” For this reason, the utility of 
grandmothers’ labor to the success of the family is more apparent in this context than it 
would be today. Proponents of this theory believe that the assumption that women, and 
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therefore grandmothers, provide uncompensated domestic labor helps explain why 
humans are one of the only species where “females live on long past the age of 
reproduction (Lambert 2019).” What I want to emphasize here is that the gendered 
domestic duty shouldered by women is so pervasive that it may have created an 
evolutionary change reflected in all women.  
With this in mind, it is clear that the assumptions of the traditionally gendered 
family (mainly that women will not take part in wage labor) informs the paths that all 
women take to some degree. As a result, one of the most important forces behind the 
economic disparities between working men and women is the careers that individuals 
choose to pursue (Okin 145). Examples of female-dominated industries include teaching, 
nursing, administrative support and service/care work (Okin 144). Okin suggests that 
women may choose these fields because they allow for greater flexibility in fulfilling 
domestic duties associated with motherhood (Okin 144). However, it goes without saying 
that many within these fields are not mothers and chose these professions for other 
reasons. In this way, the gendered expectations that accompany motherhood exercise 
power during young women’s development that endures whether or not they choose to 
have children.  
Critically, these fields are underpaid as compared to male dominated professions, 
and offer limited prospects of upward mobility (Okin 144). This is another consequence 
of the patriarchal ordering of the workplace (Olin Wright). The main takeaway here 
should be that all women are subject to the force of the assumptions of the traditionally 
gendered family, as these assumptions are inextricably connected to gender broadly. In 
this way, as I have demonstrated, gender inhibits women’s ability to realize the outcomes 
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they desire compared to men. Additionally, we should question desires that are a 
byproduct of the unjust construction of gender. We cannot treat these desires in the same 
way that economists treat preferences. We must consider the manner in which our social 
arrangements shape these desires in a way that replicates existing forms of unfreedom 
and domination.  
On the other side of things, Awa Thiam claims that, by virtue of their gender 
privilege, men have “access to the world at large, [and] the opportunity to develop his 
intellectual and physical faculties in a range of experiences (Thiam 119).” While my 
previous few pages have focused on the way in which gender diminishes women’s ability 
to achieve valued outcomes economically, I must point out that gender works to men’s 
advantage in attaining their economic goals. As Thiam posits, because gender assumes 
that men will primarily work outside of the household, men are able to develop skills and 
connections that are highly valued economically. Because of this, as Elizabeth Anderson 
holds in Unstrapping the Straitjacket of ‘Preference,’ men are more able to develop 
“human capital,” thereby increasing their ability to achieve desired outcomes (Anderson 
33). As Okin and Anderson both observe, the resulting disparity in earning potential is 
further used to legitimate men’s advantageous position thus creating a positive feedback 
loop (Anderson 33 and Okin 5). However, it is critical to note that this level of economic 
output for men within the traditionally gendered family is only possible through the 
unpaid labor that women perform (Anderson 33). Evidently, gender offers men increased 
opportunity to achieve their desired outcomes by enforcing the servility of women. As a 




In tandem, these statements from Martin, Thiam and Anderson support my 
contention that gender leaves women at a disadvantage in achieving desired professional 
outcomes relative to men. Both genders certainly have expectations and duties placed 
upon them, but these do not function equally. The fact that gender has traditionally 
delegated the household as the proper place for women’s labor has isolated women from 
the formal economy and civil society generally. As I have demonstrated, it is clear that 
the domestic expectations that characterize gender act upon all women to some degree, 
not only mothers. These expectations stand in the way of women being able to capitalize 
on the same opportunities that men are afforded. Now recall, the definition of the 
opportunity aspect of freedom, which requires that individuals be able to “achieve 
outcomes that they value and have reason to value,” including but not limited to 
economic achievement. If gender stands in the way of women's ability to achieve desired 
outcomes compared to men, then evidently gender is incompatible with the full 
realization of the opportunity aspect of freedom.  
 
GENDER AND THE PROCESS ASPECT OF FREEDOM 
 
Shifting now to the process aspect of freedom, as I mentioned earlier, the process 
aspect of freedom relates to the individual's ability to exercise “freedom of actions and 
decisions (Sen 17).” Sen emphasizes the importance of freedom in decision making 
specifically in relation to “ participation in political decisions and social choice (Sen 
291).” He also asserts that “unfreedom can arise...through inadequate processes (Sen 
17).” As I will demonstrate, gender is an impediment to the exercise of free agency in 
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decision making for both genders, but particularly for women. Beginning with, political 
participation, gender has traditionally left women on the margins of political life. 
Historically, women have been explicitly excluded from political participation, and at the 
very least consistently underrepresented within governing bodies. As a consequence, 
political philosophy has treated politics as the exclusive domain of men. In the social 
sphere, gender  leaves women with less decision making power within the family, as well 
as the community more broadly. Moreover, gender also unjustly dictates what sort of life 
is normatively appropriate for an individual to pursue based on the delegation of duties, 
privileges and expectations according to gender and their enforcement. In terms of In this 
way, gender constitutes unfreedom when considering the process aspect of freedom.  
Historically, gender has been tied to political participation with men, specifically 
white men, being regarded as the sole beings capable of political thought. In The Struggle 
for Reason in Africa, Mogobe B. Ramose asserts that the dehumanizing characterization 
of Africans and indigenous people as lacking rationality “is the foundation of racism 
(Ramose 3).” Through the active process of the construction of whiteness, the recognition 
of seemingly neutral concepts common to all humans, such as rationality, was made 
conditional upon phenotypic characteristics as well as heritage (Ramose 3). More 
concretely, the linkage of reason and humanity was weaponized against Africans as well 
as indiginous people globally in order to justify claims of white superiority (Ramose 1).  
The linkage of reason and humanity also effectively implied that anyone who was not 
regarded as “rational” was not fully human (Ramose 1).This is what Ramose refers to as 
the “struggle for reason (Ramose 1).” The notion that only white men possessed reason 
was used to legitimate colonialism and missionary activity as beneficent acts given that 
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black and indigenous people supposedly lacked the rationality required for self 
determination (Ramose 1). Clearly, the capacity for reason has long been intimately 
connected to the right of political participation 
Critically, Ramose holds that the “struggle for reason” is rooted in Aristotle’s 
statement that “man is a rational creature (Ramose 1).” Aristotle's choice to refer to 
“man” as rational had the important implication characterizing women as incapable of 
reason (Ramose 1).  As Ramose describes the consequences of the struggle of reason for 
African’s rights, the notion that rationality is unique to men has also been used to justify 
the exclusion of women from political participation (Okin 8).  Moreover, Okin states that 
Aristotle’s regarded women as “not fundamentally equal to the free men who participate 
in political justice, but inferiors whose natural function is to serve those who are more 
fully human (Okin 14).” Here, again we see that the characterization of women as lacking 
rationality dehumanized women similarly to how the same statement regarding African’s 
supported the white supremacist idea that African’s were not fully human. Undoubtedly, 
the struggle for reason has led to the exclusion of both black people and women from full 
participation in political life. 
Recall that a central component of my definition of gender is the idea that 
biological sex serves as the basis for normative assumptions and expectations for a 
person. Put differently, any assumption that is made based only upon an individuals 
perceived biological sex constitutes gender. As I pointed out two paragraphs ago, the 
recognition of rationality was made contingent on the presence of certain phenotypic 
characteristics. In the case of black people, this was most notably skin color, while for 
women sex served as the basis for these unjust judgements. With this in mind, it is clear 
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that this characterization of women is not merely a form of sexism. Instead, the idea that 
women lack reason is inseparable from the historical, patriarchal construction of gender. 
This supports my contention that gender is incompatible with the full realization of the 
process aspect of freedom.  
 Aristotle is not alone in his exclusion of the possibility of women’s participation 
in politics. For example, the writings of Saint Augustine position women as equal to men 
“in their capacity to share in the divine life,” but hold that women should be controlled by 
men and “restricted to the domestic sphere” and thus excluded from political life (Okin 
57). Similarly, Saint Thomas Aquinas believed that women, unlike men, did not have the 
capacity for reason and should be excluded from politics (Okin 57-58). This articulation 
of the struggle for reason was used by Aquinas to justify male domination of women as 
being for their own good (Okin 58). Likewise, Rousseau believed that no harm was done 
by denying women political participation given his belief that husbands could adequately 
represent the family as a whole (Okin 26-27). While the struggle for reason was used to 
exclude Africans from political participation, the concept served the same purpose in 
relation to women, while simultaneously justifying the hierarchical structure of the 
patriarchal family. 
Okin highlights the fact that nearly all theories of justice  “have assumed that the 
"individual" who is the basic subject of the theories is the male head of a patriarchal 
household (Okin 14).” For example, this same assumption is made by John Rawls in A 
Theory of Justice in stating that those in the original positions are “heads of families 
(Okin 92). The importance of this assumption is not simply rhetorical. Instead, adoption 
of the value of patriarchal household has directly resulted in women’s marginalization 
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from political life. For example, Okin points out that Bradwell v. Illionois prevented 
women from practicing law based on the rationale that the patriarchal family, “that was 
held to require the dependence of women and their exclusion from civil and political life” 
was essential to the United States’ “stability and order (Okin 19).” This is an example of 
the “public/domestic dichotomy” that delegates women’s proper sphere of activity to the 
home only (Okin 110-111). 
 With this background, it is clear that the idea that women lack rationality has 
been entrenched over time to justify women’s exclusion from the political process. This 
is most evident when considering women’s explicit exclusion from voting. Women did 
not gain the right to vote in the United States until 1920 with the United Kingdom 
following suit eight years later (Infoplease). France and Switzerland, both considered 
relatively progressive nations, did not grant women suffrage until 1944 and 1971 
respectively (Infoplease). Most recently, women were allowed to vote for the first time in 
the United Arab Emirates in 2006 and in Saudi Arabia in 2011 (Infoplease).  
However, just because women have the right to vote on paper does not mean that 
they are able to participate in the political process equally to men. For example, in 
Afghanistan women’s ability to vote is significantly restricted by the requirement that 
they obtain a male family member's permission to leave the house (Aspinal). This has not 
stopped many brave women from voting and running for office even, when faced with 
violent threats from the Taliban as well as protests from religious conservatives 
(Aspinal). Similarly, in Pakistan women are frequently “barred from voting by their 
husbands and village elders,” again often suffering public scorn and violence as a result 
(Aspinal). Additionally, nations like, but not limited to, Uganda and Kenya fail to 
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consider the expectations of household labor that women are subject to which make it 
difficult to take the time out to vote (Aspinal).  
Beyond these examples, even in more developed nations (under Sen’s definition) 
women are unfree when considering political participation and its relation to the process 
aspect of freedom. This is exemplified in women’s underrepresentation in elected offices 
in most “developed democracies.” At the time of writing this thesis, there are currently 
101 women in the United States’ House of Representatives (23.2 %), and 26 in the senate 
(26%) (CAWP Rutgers). While this is certainly an improvement from 1989, the year that 
Okin’s Justice, Gender and the Family was published, when there were only two female 
senators, there is no question that women still do not hold the same political power that 
men do. In fact, according to Pew Research Center data, the US is very average in terms 
of women’s representation in national legislative bodies (Atske 2020). Globally, 24% of 
all national legislative seats are occupied by women (Atske 2020). In fact, only three 
nations, Cuba, Rwanda, and Bolivia have at least a proportionate share of women within 
their legislatures (Atske 2020). Based on this evidence, it is an empirical fact that 
globally women do not hold the same political power as men. Put differently, across the 
world, women do not equally participate in the process of political decision making. 
Unquestionably then, gender is a form of unfreedom when considered from the process 
aspect of freedom. 
One of the main reasons for women's underrepresentation in national legislative 
bodies is related to the traditionally gendered family. Firstly, as Okin would suggest, 
“until there is justice within the family, women will not be able to gain equality in 
politics (Okin 4).” Here, once more the assumed domestic burden shouldered by women 
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makes it more difficult to run for office than it would be for a man within a traditionally 
gendered family. Okin theorizes that if men and women shared equally in domestic 
responsibilities then women would likely be more evenly represented in political offices 
(Okin 171, 179). This is because often women are forced to choose between having 
children and “attaining positions of the greatest social influence” such as a congressional 
representative (Okin 171). Because of their gender, men do not face this same 
predicament. This perspective is supported by British politician Shirley Williams who 
expressed the sentiment that until men bear their fair share of familial responsibilities, the 
vast majority of women will be unable to pursue a “job as demanding as politics (Okin 
104).” 
To anticipate a potential objection, an opponent of my perspective may claim that 
whether women are equally represented in government is not an issue as long as women’s 
perspectives are  accounted for by male representatives. However, as Okin argues men 
cannot adequately embody women’s views in politics such that actual representation is 
not necessary (Okin 102). As I have previously mentioned regarding Carol Gilligan’s 
Jack and Jill example, and as Okin articulates, “the different life experiences of females 
and males from the start in fact affect their respective psychologies, modes of thinking, 
and patterns of moral development in significant ways (Okin 106). As a result, there is 
significant evidence to support the claim that women’s perspectives are unique from 
men’s, who are unable to truly put themselves in women’s shoes (Okin 106-107). 
Accordingly, Okin holds that women’s underrepresentation in politics prevents the 
creation of a “fully human moral or political theory (Okin 107).” Recognizing this, it is 
impossible to claim that women can participate fully in the process of political choice 
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through voting alone. True realization of the process aspect of freedom for women 
requires gender parity within legislative bodies.   
Briefly summarizing my argument in this section so far, one critical component of 
the process aspect of freedom is the ability to participate in the political process. 
However, gender has been constructed in a way that affords men much greater agency 
politically. Historically, the concept of “reason” and its limitation to white males 
legitimized women’s exclusion from political life, as seen in the Rousseau, Aquinas, 
Augustine and Rawls examples. As with the struggle for reason generally, the presence of 
reason was tied to physical characteristics, in this case sex. Based on my definition given 
in the first chapter, the linkage of sex with rationality makes clear that the phenomenon I 
am describing is an example of gender and not sexism. The consequences of this 
component of gender are still felt to this day, most notably in women’s 
disenfranchisement and underrepresentation within government. As I have shown, 
women certainly have less of an ability to make their voices heard through the political 
process than men. Given that the process aspect of freedom requires the ability to 
participate in the political decision making process, it is clear that women are unfree 
relative to men due to their gender with regards to the process aspect of freedom. 
 Another crucial part of the process aspect of freedom is the ability for people to 
exercise free agency in their social/private lives. Here, the process aspect of freedom is 
reflected in individuals’ ability to make decisions for themselves within their family and 
community and influence others (Sen 5, 110, 286). This is what Sen refers to as “social 
choice.” While impediments to the process aspect of freedom may take the forms of laws 
that seek to control individuals actions explicitly, free agency is also affected by informal 
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institutions, as is the case with gender. Informal institutions have the ability to dictate the 
way in which people conceive of their position/role within society, which in turn shapes 
individuals actions as a result of the normative force that lies within the collective 
enforcement of social constructs like gender. In the following paragraphs I argue that 
gender is incompatible with true social choice given the hierarchical structure of the 
family. Furthermore, gender leaves women with less influence in the broader community, 
even further diminishing the possibility of social choice. On top of this, gender’s inherent 
delegation of a particular “proper life” based on sex is incompatible with the free agency 
that social choice requires. Accordingly, it is clear that gender stands in the way of the 
process aspect of freedom as it relates to social choice. 
As prominent feminist thinkers like Susan Moller Okin argue, the traditionally 
gendered family is necessarily hierarchical with the father/husband occupying the 
dominant position (Okin 19, 134-135). As Okin observes, this hierarchy is intimately 
related to the economic advantage that men receive as a result of the gendered division of 
labor (Okin 95). For example, Okin points out that fathers/husbands are often able to use 
“the fact that he is the wage earner to "pull rank" on or to abuse his wife (Okin 22).” This 
example demonstrates the way in which gender leaves women with less decision making 
power within the family. In fact, thinkers like Louis de Bonald argued that structural 
similarities of the family informed and were crucial to the maintenance of totalitarian 
governments (Okin 18-19).  
Somewhat similarly, “Rousseau, Hegel, Tocqueville...all defended the hierarchy 
of the marital structure while spurning such a degree of hierarchy in institutions and 
practices outside the household (Okin 19).” With this in mind, it is indisputable that the 
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traditionally gendered family leaves women with significantly less agency than the male 
head of household. So much less agency, in fact, that the most accurate comparison with 
another institution is with a totalitarian government. Importantly, these characterizations 
of the traditionally gendered family were articulated by proponents of this institution, not 
radicals calling for its abolition. If the family is a dictatorship with the father at the head, 
then women have less social choice by virtue of their gender. In this case, when I say 
social choice I am referring to the capacity for decision making within the family. 
Consequently, it is evident that gender as traditionally constructed cannot exist if we 
desire to realize the full extent of the  process aspect of freedom for all people.  
As Adrienne Martin articulates even more strongly in Against Mother's Day and 
Employee Appreciation Day, domesticity “represents a form of slavery,” which entails 
prioritizing familial duties over self interest (Martin 2, 4). Martin points out that 
oftentimes mothers’ actions in service of their family are motivated by fear and prevent 
mothers from attaining “more highly valued social roles (Martin 6,7,12).” We again see 
that gender diminishes women’s free agency and social choice. First of all, the 
enforcement of the burden of domesticity within the family often prevents women from 
acting in their own self interest. One important example of this is the fact that women 
often do not have the same ability to enjoy leisure time as their male partners (Okin 95). 
Additionally, the enforcement of domesticity can hinder mothers ability to pursue 
meaningful commitments outside of the home (Martin 14). This can prevent women from 
achieving highly valued and prestigious opportunities that would allow for greater 
influence within the family and community more broadly. Here, the enforcement of the 
gendered division of labor diminishes women’s agency within the family, and therefore 
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their ability to pursue and define their desires, as well as exercise influence over their 
communities, both of which are central to the process aspect of freedom and social 
choice.  
Perhaps most importantly, definitionally gender is diametrically opposed to the 
idea of free agency in social choice.  Recall my definition of gender given in chapter one. 
I state that gender delegates duties, privileges, and expectations and ascribes onto every 
individual a binary conception of what constitutes a proper life. Moreover, I point out that 
deviations from gendered expectations carries very real consequences for those who 
choose to challenge these established conventions. For example, as I have discussed at 
length, gender delegates the duty of domesticity to women based on sex assigned at birth. 
This social role is not freely chosen, it is assigned. Additionally, this ascription of what 
constitutes as “proper life” may frequently stand in the way of women’s ability to pursue 
and define their desires. As Martin reminds us, “deviations from these expectations are 
seen as, at best, surprising and, at worst, a source of shame and opprobrium (Martin 4).” 
To sum up these two related ideas, gender from birth defines what actions, behaviors and 
desires are appropriate for a person based on a physical characteristic. Here, the 
individual has no choice but to comply or else face social repercussions.  
The process aspect of freedom requires that each individual have the ability to 
exercise freedom in their actions and decisions (Sen 17). However, this is impossible 
living under an institution that delegates duties and expectations on an arbitrary basis to 
which individuals are expected to conform their lives or face significant consequences. 
We do not get to freely choose our gender and its connected roles. Additionally, simply 
because someone can break a rule does not mean that the enforcement of that rule does 
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not constitute a violation of the individuals freedom to choose. Plainly, whatever stands 
in the way of people's ability to freely make choices for themselves is an obstacle to the 
full exercise of the process aspect of freedom. With this in mind, gender clearly 
constitutes a significant unfreedom in this respect alone.  
To sum up my argument put forward in this subsection, gender prevents true 
social choice and therefore the process aspect of freedom. The hierarchical structure of 
the patriarchal family implied by gender is frequently compared to a dictatorship. If one 
accepts, as I believe Sen would, that social choice cannot exist under dictatorship then it 
is clear that the process aspect of freedom cannot be realized within the traditionally 
gendered family. Others compare the structure of the traditionally gendered family to 
slavery. As is the case with slavery, uncompensated labor and the fear of violence prevent 
the existence of freedom. Moreover, the concept of gender as I have defined it is entirely 
incompatible with social choice, as the duties and expectations implied are delegated 
along a totally arbitrary basis and actively enforced. Given that gender is incompatible 
with social choice, it is apparent that gender constitutes a significant form of unfreedom 
in that it violates the process aspect. 
  
EVALUATIVE AND EFFECTIVENESS REASONS 
 
As I established in the past two sections, gender qualifies as a form of unfreedom 
when considered from both the prospect and opportunity aspects of freedom. With this in 
mind, I want to turn to the evaluative and effectiveness reasons to prioritize freedom in 
development. Briefly looking first at the evaluative reason, Sen states that “assessment of 
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progress has to be done primarily in terms of whether the freedoms that people have are 
enhanced (Sen 4). This point is intimately connected to the constitutive role of freedom, 
which holds that freedom is the “primary end” of development given the fact that 
increased freedom improves the lives of all people (Sen 36). As I mentioned in my 
reconstruction of Sen’s argument, the constitutive role of freedom relates to the removal 
of various forms of unfreedom. With this in mind, the evaluative reason is simply based 
on Sen’s definition of development. Sen defines development as the process of increasing 
the degree of “real freedom” that individuals enjoy within a particular society. The 
evaluative reason merely states that prioritizing the expansion of freedom is necessary 
because it is required by the definition of development.  
To connect this to gender, given that I have established gender as a form of 
unfreedom, the evaluative reason would imply that development is inseparable from the 
process of dismantling/abolishing gender. Critically, this statement rests upon the idea 
that if gender was no longer a form of unfreedom, then it would no longer exist as we 
know it. For example, if gender is no longer tied to the delegation of domestic duty, then 
we have significantly moved towards genderlessness. If all such ascriptions of social 
roles are dismantled, then we have achieved genderlessness. With this being said, 
considering the constitutive role of freedom, it is clear that because gender stands in the 
way of individuals’ agency in pursuing, achieving and defining their goals, then 
dismantling gender constitutes the promotion of freedom and therefore development. In 
this context, the evaluative reason holds that progress requires that gender must be 
dismantled in order to achieve development to the highest degree. Because unfreedom is 
inextricably linked to gender, the removal of these unfreedoms that development 
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necessitates is to move towards dismantling/abolishing gender. To reiterate, Sen’s 
evaluative reason makes clear that if full development is to be realized a complete 
deconstruction of gender must occur.    
Turning now to the effectiveness reason, Sen’s observation that the effects of 
increasing women’s agency is not limited to improvements for only women, but society 
as a whole, confirms that gender functions like all other forms of unfreedom (Sen 191).  
As Sen argues, empowering women economically and through education does not only 
address the specific challenges faced by women. Instead, giving women increased agency 
also uplifts others as exemplified by decreased child mortality. This example of the 
positive consequences of the promotion of women’s agency on non-women illuminates 
Sen’s “effectiveness reason,” which has the implication of revealing the way in which 
gender’s negative effects are not limited to only women.  
Amartya Sen mainly chooses to focus on two ways by which women’s capacity as 
decision making agents is increased. Specifically, through increased participation in the 
formalized economy, and through education. Critically, economic and educational 
empowerment do not simply promote the wellbeing of women, but allow for women to 
better advocate for, and pursue what they identify as being in their interest (Sen 189-190). 
This is what Sen refers to as the “agency aspect of women’s movements” that allows 
women to be “the dynamic promoters of social transformations that can alter the lives of 
both women and men (Sen 189-190).”  Sen makes clear that increasing agency amounts 




As Sen points out, within the family, part of the reason for the asymmetric agency 
between men and women is the economic power that men tend to possess as the 
“breadwinner (Sen 194).” On the other hand, the traditionally gendered family typically 
assigns domestic labor duties to women that reduce their ability to participate in the 
formalized economy (Sen 194). Critically, the ability to earn money and support the 
family financially elevates women’s relative position within the family (Sen 194). In this 
way, the freedom to seek employment outside of the household increases women’s 
agency which, in turn, “seems to help to foster freedom in other [areas of life] (Sen 
194).” 
  Similarly, Sen points out that education is a powerful channel through which 
women’s agency can be elevated. Education is central to promoting freedom in “social 
opportunities,” which contributes to “the individual's substantive freedom to live better 
(Sen 39).” Looking specifically at illiteracy, the inability to read diminishes individuals 
ability to participate fully in the economy, as well as the political process (Sen 39). 
Specifically, individuals who cannot read are unable to work in jobs that “require 
production according to specification or demand strict quality control (Sen 39).” 
Likewise, illiteracy leaves individuals unable to access the information contained in 
newspapers, and the internet, or advocate for their interests through writing (Sen 39). In 
terms of the gendered effects of illiteracy, the inability to read or write reinforces 
relationships of dependence and asymmetric agency between men and women.  
 Of course, increased agency allows for women to better advocate on their 
own behalf, however, it is crucial to recognize that promoting women’s agency also leads 
to the development of greater freedoms for all. The promotion of women’s agency 
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through education and economic empowerment encourages the development of what Sen 
calls “protective security” for children, not only women (Sen 40). Protective security 
encompasses the “freedom to survive (Sen 52).” As Sen states, “There is considerable 
evidence that women's education and literacy tend to reduce the mortality rates of 
children (Sen 195).” Sen argues that increasing agency for women within the family 
results in greater emphasis being placed on the wellbeing of children (Sen 195). In 
particular, increasing women’s agency through literacy seems to be the most significant 
force in promoting child survival as opposed to “male literacy or general poverty 
reduction (Sen 197-198).” Though, the relationship is not so clear with regards to 
economic participation, given the fact that women may not be able to actually gain better 
child care for their children when faced with the “double burden” or domestic and 
economic labor (Sen 196). Nevertheless, what this example shows us is that the 
promotion of women’s free agency (in this case primarily through education) contributes 
to the development of freedom for all people, not only women. Evidently, the 




In conclusion, this chapter  focused on Amartya Sen’s vision of human 
development based on freedom, which consists of an “opportunity” and “process” aspect. 
As I argue, the economically vulnerable position of women, and their exclusion from 
political life are constitutively tied to gender and inhibit the “opportunity” and “process” 
aspect of freedom respectively. Because Sen asserts that development requires the 
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elimination of forms of unfreedom, and given that gender constitutes a form of 
unfreedom,  I established that implicit in Sen’s theory is an argument for gender 
abolition. We have significant reason to believe that gender is a form of unfreedom 
because it acts in very much the same way as other forms of unfreedom, as evidenced by 
the fact that the promotion of women’s agency uplifts those around them. This is an 
example of the effectiveness reason for promoting freedom. If gender no longer 
consituted a form of unfreedom, this would requires the dissolution of the constitutive 
elements of gender including the linkage of biological sex and gender, as well as the 















CHAPTER 5: How Gender Harms Men  
 
Up to this point, my analysis has focused almost exclusively on the ways in which 
gender harms women. It is undeniable that women are relatively worse off under 
patriarchy than men. However, this does not mean that men are not also harmed by 
gender. Even from the perspective of men, who are generally privileged by gender, 
abolition would still improve the human condition. Flatly, gender does not serve men or 
women’s interest. In the following pages, I explore the negative effects that the 
patriarchal construction manhood has on men themselves. I begin by arguing that gender 
harms men from an epistemic perspective. Here, I draw on the work of Briana Toole on 
standpoint epistemology to advance the argument that men’s social position in patriarchal 
society hinders their ability to come to understand some core realities of human relations. 
Moreover, as Robin Dembroff's work demonstrates, many men suffer gender oppression 
based on the presence of other marginalized identities that exclude them from the true 
dominant category of “real men.” In this way, many men actually suffer gender based 
oppression, which undermines the idea of unqualified male privilege. Additionally, as I 
will make clear through my discussion of these two different frameworks, these harms 
inevitably take an emotional and physical toll on men to the detriment of their emotional 









Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that focuses on the “study of the nature, 
origin, and limits of human knowledge (Britannica).” As Briana Toole points out, in a 
normative sense epistemology aims to bring humans closer to truth (Toole 2019, 598). In 
this context, epistemic harm can be defined as the “subver[sion]” of the end of 
knowledge acquisition  (Toole 2019, 598). In other words, anything that keeps humans 
from advancing their understanding of the nature of the world, or their place in it relative 
to others, constitutes an undesirable harm from an epistemic perspective. As I will 
explore in this section, gender constitutes an epistemic harm, not only for women but also 
for men. 
 Standpoint epistemology holds that social positionality and identity are of central 
importance to understanding the way that agents come to know the world (Toole 2020, 
1). Interestingly, standpoint epistemology has historically proceeded from a Marxist 
focus on the “proletarian standpoint,” and has until recently, in recognition of the work of 
philosophers like Patricia Hill Collins, eschewed critical analysis of gender in favor of 
power differential more generally (Toole 2020 1-2). One key component of standpoint 
epistemology is the idea that identity-based “nonepistemic features” affect “what an 
epistemic agent is in a position to know (Toole 2019, 598-599).” This is what is known as 
the “situated knowledge thesis (Toole 2019, 599). ” However, we are left with the 
question: what exactly is a (non)epistemic feature?  
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As Toole explains, concepts such as “evidence, justification, reliability” are 
epistemic features in the sense that they give credence to the truthfulness of a belief 
(Toole 2019, 600). Toole argues that these features can be understood as “accessible” to 
any epistemic agent; a position which is attributable to the “aperspectival” view of 
epistemology (Toole 2020, 4). Nonepistemic features, on the other hand, would seem to 
be an immeasurably larger category. Although I suppose everything from preferences to 
physical descriptors could be considered a nonepistemic social fact, what is of the 
greatest importance to standpoint epistemology in this context is social positionality and 
identity (Toole 2019, 599). Here, to reiterate, the situated knowledge thesis advances the 
idea that some knowledge is only available to certain epistemic agents by virtue of their 
social position within society (Toole 2019, 599).  
This concept is reflected in the closely related concept of “epistemic privilege,” 
which holds that members of oppressed groups gain knowledge as a result of their social 
position (Toole 2019, 600). In the case of epistemic privilege, members of the dominant 
group may fail to develop the insights into their “social situatedness,” which is a 
necessity for the powerless (Toole 2019, 600). In contrast to epistemic features, the 
knowledge acquired as a result of nonepistemic features is not easily accessible (Toole 
2020, 4). Opponents of this view may hold that these features are irrelevant to what 
someone can come to know. After all, the aperspectival view would suggest that provided 
evidence any epistemic agent can come to know what another knows (Toole 2020, 4). 
However, the concept of “achievement” stands in stark opposition to this position. The 
thesis of “achievement” holds that some forms of knowledge are produced only through 
lived experience that is dependent on social identity coupled with diligent 
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“consciousness-raising (Toole 2019, 600).” Thus far, the main takeaway of this section 
should be that social positionality affects the epistemic condition of individuals based on 
their social position. Going forward, I will focus specifically on gender as a nonepistemic 
feature that deeply shapes the epistemic condition of virtually all humans for the worse.  
Professor Toole’s feminist analysis of epistemic oppression rightly centers the 
experiences of women. Here, Toole’s analysis offers us deep insights into the way in 
which the continuous enforcement of gender specifically is connected to knowing. Toole 
states that “feminist-material accounts argue for the emergence of a distinctly feminist 
standpoint (Toole 2019, 601).” Here, I wish to begin by pointing out that this statement 
supports my previous assertion that gender creates distinct perspectives in men and 
women from childhood as evidenced in the Jack and Jill example I discussed in my 
chapter on Marx. Importantly, Toole’s analysis goes beyond a narrow focus on only 
reproductive labor to incorporate more modern, intersectional issues (Toole 2019, 602). 
For example, Toole focuses on “emotional and cognitive labor” that is often forced upon 
women, particularly women of color, within the family and within the modern workplace 
(Toole 2019, 602). This type of labor can include disproportionate, uncompensated 
mentorship or an assumed duty to take the lead in diversity training (Toole 603).  
Critically, Toole holds that, as with the more traditional assumptions that characterize the 
feminist-material account, these gendered and racialized forms of uncompensated labor 
are also translated into epistemic difference (Toole 2019, 604).  
However, Toole does not limit the scope of her analysis to labor only. Instead, the 
social position of agents generally, detached from labor, is also relevant to standpoint 
epistemology (Toole 2019, 604). Citing Gaile Pohlhaus, Toole tells us that the oppressed 
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must “develop a body of conceptual resources so as to understand the experiences they 
have in virtue of their marginalization (Toole 2019, 604).” The development of these 
“conceptual resources” is exactly what enables marginalized groups to develop 
“epistemic privilege” through achievement. In this case, achievement and the 
development of new conceptual resources occurs “when our conceptual resources are 
inadequate” to understand a particular experience or set of experiences “we reform, 
“revise” and create new resources (Toole 2019, 604).  Accordingly, the presence and 
level of development of various conceptual resources are central to the epistemic 
condition of different actors. By gaining conceptual resources through which to 
understand the world, marginalized groups acquire knowledge that is not readily 
accessible to those within the dominant group.  
With this in mind, it is apparent that women have achieved conceptual resources 
that men generally have not needed to in order to survive and make sense of their 
experiences in a patriarchal society. However, as Toole points out, and as I have 
mentioned in the past, women have been excluded from the intellectual production or 
“meaning generation” that shapes the material conditions of our world (Toole 2019, 604-
605). For example, the criminal justice system has long failed to not only care about 
issues of sexual violence but even generate the necessary language and terminology to 
conceptualize the lived experiences of women (Toole 2019, 605). This is because men, as 
“dominantly situated knowers” have not needed to develop the conceptual resources to 
address the pervasive gender-based violence carried out against women (Toole 2019, 
606). As a consequence, men are unable to perceive the issues that affect women by 
virtue of their oppressed social position within the patriarchy. Even if well-intentioned, 
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an exclusively male perspective cannot hope to adequately represent women’s interests 
fully. Clearly, patriarchal control of major institutions like the legal system codifies 
men’s epistemological blind spots into the law in a way that harms women. This is one 
example of what thinkers like Toole and Kristie Dotson would call epistemic oppression 
(Toole 2019, 608). 
With this background, I now want to transition to thinking about men’s epistemic 
position within patriarchy. Firstly, I should acknowledge that although I argue that gender 
is a source of epistemic harm for men, this does not mean that men are not the 
beneficiaries of patriarchy. As Professor Toole addresses at length in From Standpoint 
Epistemology to Epistemic Oppression, women still suffer significant epistemic 
oppression, even if they are epistemically privileged relative to men in one sense. 
Nevertheless, as I will demonstrate, gender still epistemically harms men insofar as we 
accept epistemology and truth as normative ends worth striving for. In other words, if we 
believe that humans should value and pursue truth and knowledge, then we must 
recognize that gender subverts these ends for both men and women. In this way, gender is 
definitionally an epistemic harm when considered from the perspective of either men or 
women. Furthermore, even though gender constitutes an epistemic harm in and of itself, 
this is inevitably translated into more concrete emotional and physiological issues.  
The existence of gender creates epistemic harm for men as, by virtue of their 
dominant position, men fail to fully understand the true nature of social relations under 
patriarchy in the same way that women must. This amounts to a fundamental ignorance 
of certain truths of human existence and social relation. As I have covered, the situated 
knowledge thesis holds that individuals’ social position influences the knowledge that 
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they have access to. On the one hand, women’s social position enables them to gain 
insights that men may never have. However, the reverse is equally true. Men’s social 
position stands in the way of the acquisition of knowledge.  
Here, I want to pause for a moment to reflect on some specific features and 
consequences of men’s dominant social position within patriarchy. First of all, gender 
generally serves the interests of men in a way that it does not for women. As I will 
discuss, there are plenty of reasons for men to be dissatisfied or object to our assigned 
gender roles, but undoubtedly our assigned social roles offer more freedom, agency, and 
opportunity compared to women. In this way, I argue it should be unsurprising to any 
observer if men fail to question the legitimacy of gender itself in the same way that 
women do. Flatly, because gender generally advantages men it would make sense that 
there is less incentive to question the concept at all. 
However, gender is unquestionably one of the main social constructions that 
shapes human interaction. Nevertheless, in my experiences men have been far less likely 
to have considered opinions on gender compared to women, and are more likely to put 
forward essentialist arguments claiming there is a fundamental biological difference 
between men and women that legitimizes many parts of gender. This is certainly not to 
say that no men question gender (or that all women do). Increasingly, particularly from 
what I have seen on college campuses, many men are really putting in the time and effort 
to examine some of the fundamental tenets of masculinity that hurt men themselves as 
well as society more broadly. Still, it is much easier for men to dismiss the impact of 
gender and leave this immensely powerful concept unexamined and unquestioned given 
their position as a dominant knower (Toole 2019, 606, 610).  
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Since many men fail to interrogate this crucial social construction that dictates so 
much of our lives, it seems apparent that the unconcerned man that makes little effort to 
learn more about these issues is left epistemically disadvantaged. Thus, gender leaves 
many men with a very inadequate and incomplete picture of human social relations, the 
world, and their position in it. This is very similar to the way in which people who claim 
to “not see race” remain deeply ignorant to one of the most potent concepts structuring 
social relations in our country. Fundamentally, failing to question and reflect upon the 
legitimacy of gender leaves individuals in an epistemically harmful position. Because of 
their social positionality, in this case gender and specifically maleness, men are not 
forced to question gender in the same way as women. Therefore, gender harms men from 
an epistemic perspective by obscuring realities that are accessible to individuals with a 
different social identity. 
Transitioning, to return to the issue of sexual violence against women that I 
touched on in my reconstruction of Toole’s argument, I hold that men’s social position 
can lead to profound naivete with regards to human nature. One place where this is 
incredibly evident, in my personal experience, is on college campuses. A lot of men, by 
virtue of their dominant social position in patriarchal society, have not ever had to be 
concerned about, or subject to, violence, or had to really consider the idea of evil. This is 
even more apparent when we consider the privileged background that many students 
come from on-campus. However, the same is not true for even the most economically 
privileged women on campus. Tragically, according to a 2018 survey of students across 
the Claremont Colleges, 15% of participants (nearly 1 in 6) have reported being sexually 
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assaulted during their time on campus (Empower Center). Clearly, sexual assault is a 
pervasive issue on all college campuses including Claremont Mckenna.  
Personally, one of the most shocking realizations of college for me was figuring 
out how many of these perpetrators appear to be normal, upstanding members of our 
community. One major reason this was shocking to me was my male privilege. As a man, 
I have never needed to consider my safety on campus. As a result, it took me a while to 
recognize the true scope of this issue. Importantly, while a lot of men on campus do 
recognize this reality, I believe many also fail to consider this violently gendered aspect 
of the college experience. Here, men’s blindness to the plight of women leads to a 
fundamental misunderstanding about a fact of human nature in a way that contributes to 
the maintenance of rape culture. Men, particularly privileged men, have not had to learn 
the lesson that even the most unassuming people are capable of evil actions. In this way, 
many men are incredibly ignorant to not only the reality of violence that over half of our 
peers face on campus on a daily basis, but are also incredibly naive to the potential for 
evil that lies within every person. Men, by virtue of their social position, have not had to 
learn this grim reality in the same way that women have. This amounts to a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of the world and humanity, or in other words, an 
epistemic harm. 
To focus on the material issues posed by failing to critically evaluate gender, 
many men fail to identify, and subsequently challenge, a lot of the most destructive 
aspects of masculinity. In the end, this epistemic failing hurts men both emotionally and 
physiologically. As Barbara Eirenreich describes in The Hearts of Men: American 
Dreams and the Flight from Commitment, as early as the 1950’s cardiologists were 
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beginning to realize that masculinity presented a serious health risk for men (Eirenreich, 
70). Within the traditionally gendered family, men generally assume the role of the 
breadwinner, providing for the family economically. This unchosen social role carries an 
enormous amount of stress, which scientists were increasingly realizing was a major 
contributing factor in coronary disease that disproportionately killed men (Eirenreich 
74).”   
During this same period, women increasingly engaged in wage labor within the 
formalized economy, but did not suffer increased mortality from heart disease (Eirenreich 
73-74). Additionally, just because men do more work outside the household in the 
traditionally gendered family, it does not follow that women do less work overall 
(Eirenreich 74). Moreover, this is not to say that women do not experience stress as a 
result of their gendered social position, but rather “that there is a special, lethal kind of 
stress associated with the breadwinner's role” that has widely been recognized by the 
medical community (Eirenreich 78). In tandem, these three realities suggest that the 
causation of heart disease was not work or stress generally, but instead the specific 
stresses associated with the gendered delegation of certain crushing responsibilities to 
men (Eirenreich 74, 79). 
Critically, even recognition of the gendered prescriptions of masculinity can be 
“enough to make many men feel tense and anxious at all times (Eirenreich 77).” In this 
way, it is not enough for men to attempt to limit their stress by making minute lifestyle 
changes, such as eating healthier or meditating. These insignificant changes would not 
substantively challenge men’s assigned gender role. Instead, what is necessary from a 
health perspective is for men to rebel against their assigned social role, and therefore 
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gender itself. While I have suggested that men often fail to critically interrogate gender 
given their dominant position within patriarchy, I must point out that many men actually 
do precisely this as Eirenreich describes of the beatniks. It is with this background that 
Eirenreich describes “male deviants,” like the beatniks, as rebeling not only against their 
unchosen, gendered social roles, but also against a system that presents a profound threat 
to their physiological wellbeing (Eirenreich 80).”  
To relate this discussion back to standpoint epistemology and the situated 
knowledge thesis, men’s tendency to leave their ascribed social roles unchallenged is a 
direct consequence of the epistemic harm inherent in gender. This is then translated into 
negative health outcomes in a way that can only be remedied by deconstructing gender 
itself, which in turn requires attention to gender’s epistemic characteristics. In this way, 
the epistemic harms associated with masculinity quickly become physiological harms. 
Gender has assigned to men a social role that is bad for their health. This reality goes 
beyond Eirenreich’s example of coronary heart disease. For example, given that violence 
is central to our patriarchal construction of gender, it is unsurprising that so many men 
die violent deaths.  
As a result of men’s dominant position within patriarchy, many men fail to 
develop a precise understanding of gender and its social components and instead focus 
only on essential biological characteristics. Consequently, men are relatively unequipped 
to make sense of the disastrous effects that gender has on their mental and physical 
wellbeing. Here, the epistemic harm’s of gender prevent men from being able to respond 
in the right way to the deadly effect of unchosen gender roles. With this in mind, we see 
clearly that it is critical that men begin to challenge their gender roles, which will lead to 
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positive epistemic changes. For example, if men challenge the assumptions of the 
traditionally gendered family, then they will likely uncover some crucial truths regarding 
the scope and function of patriarchy. Challenging these norms, and even the process of 
becoming more aware of gender's true nature, are concrete steps towards abolition (and 
therefore constitute acts of abolition) that will improve the mental and physical health of 
men.   
 
PATRIARCHY BENEFITS “REAL MEN,” NOT ALL MEN 
 
Shifting away from epistemic harms, in this section I draw upon Robin 
Dembroff’s Putting Real Men on Top to advance the broader claim that men can also be 
oppressed by virtue of their gender. Dembroff begins her discussion by showing how the 
construction of gender varies across time and place, as I have noted in many different 
spots, in an intersectional way (Debroff 2). That is to say that what it means to be a 
heterosexual white man is distinct from being a gay black man in a way that cannot be 
accounted for by simply looking at these intersecting identities in isolation.  
Dembroff argues that the “binary view of patriarchy” is fundamentally flawed 
(Dembroff 2). Under the binary view, patriarchy exclusively benefits all men and harms 
all women (Dembroff 2). However, as Dembroff observes, this notion is plainly false 
when we consider the fact that, for example, black men have often been the “targets, 
rather than beneficiaries, of patriarchy (Dembroff 2).” Dembroff then posits that the idea 
that men always benefit from patriarchy in a binary manner represents an essentialist 
notion within intersectionality and post structuralist philosophy, both of which claim to 
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be anti essentialist (Dembroff 2). In this way, Dembroff is critiquing the concept of 
“unqualified male privilege” by suggesting that the “bearing physical markers of 
maleness does not, of itself, make a person or group unqualified recipients of so-called 
‘male privilege’, nor does it make them immune from gender oppression. (Dembroff 2).”  
This perspective shines clearly through in Dembroffs analysis of two quotes from 
Marilyn Frye and MacKinnon. On the one hand, Frye claims that “men are not oppressed 
as men” and that being male is something that a man will always “have going for him 
(Dembroff 3).” Similarly, MacKinnon makes a slightly different but closely related claim 
that men generally speaking have not been subjected to patriarchal violence, although she 
does acknowledge that some subcategories of men have (Dembroff 3). Importantly, this 
privileges a particular version of man as the default, generic form, an important 
assumption that I will cover in the following paragraph. However, to restate Dembroff’s 
position, they maintain that thinking of gender oppression in purely binary terms is 
reductionist in that it ignores “the fact that many marginalized men also are targets of 
systemic gender injustice under patriarchy (Dembroff 4).” Furthermore, a binary view of 
gender oppression fails to give sufficient attention to the intersection of gender with 
“features such as race, class, sexuality, and disability (Dembroff 4).”  Consequently, 
thinking about gender oppression through this essentialist lens obscures “the substantial 
impact that these features have on the experiences and social positions of various men 
and women (Dembroff 4).” 
This raises the question: who exactly are the beneficiaries of patriarchy? With this 
background, Dembroff gives us an alternate framework that helps elucidate the 
distribution of gender-based oppression considering that careful analysis reveals that this 
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type of oppression does not actually occur cleanly along gender lines.  More specifically, 
“real men” function to delineate between the beneficiaries and victims of patriarchy 
(Dembroff 13). Offering a specific definition of “real men,” Dembroff asserts that real 
men are those the men “who primarily benefit from dominant ideals of manhood, and the 
systemic subordination of women and marginalized men (Dembroff 4).” Dembroff 
reminds us that because gender is a social construction, the category of “real men” is 
dynamic and varies temporally (Dembroff 5). In theory, Dembroff acknowledges that this 
means that currently marginalized men could become “real men (Dembroff 5).” Given 
the variability of this term, Dembroff declines to attempt to offer a concrete definition of 
“real men,” but offers guidance by suggesting that we evaluate “which features, in a 
given place and time, result in persistent and systemic gender-based injustice (Dembroff 
5).”  
Those who are not considered to be “real men” are marginalized and face gender-
based oppression. With this in mind, it is clear that these marginalized men are also 
victims of the way that patriarchy functions. Here, Dembroff accounts for three different 
ways in which men who are excluded from the category of “real men” are disadvantaged 
because of their gender identity. Specifically, victims of gender oppression, including 
marginalized men, find themselves subject to “double standards” in “double binds” and 
are forced to “double down (Dembroff 5).” 
Perhaps the most easily recognizable of these three concepts, double standards in 
Dembroffs view refers to the way in which gendered assumptions, duties and 
expectations are applied “inconsistently, in a way that censures marginalized men and 
excuses “real men” for the same behavior (Dembroff 5).” For example, violence is 
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intimately connected to the patriarchal conception of masculinity. From childhood, young 
boys are frequently encouraged to assert their masculinity through physical domination. 
This component of masculinity is also readily apparent in the media that we consume. 
However, as Dembroff points out, this normative conception of masculinity is a double 
standard. While violence is “excused or encouraged as proof of manhood” for white men, 
Black men are judged by a very different standard (Dembroff 29). In contrast, violence 
commited by black men has been used to justify oppression in the form of mass 
incarceration, lynching, and police brutality (Dembroff 29). In this way, men excluded 
from the category of “real men” face gender based oppression through the imposition of 
double standards. 
Relatedly, double binds are scenarios in which any action an individual takes will 
be met with social sanctions (Dembroff 5). In double binds, no matter what choice 
someone makes they will be faced with either “penalty, censure or deprivation (Dembroff 
5)”. To put it simply, double binds leave people in positions of “damned if you do, 
damned if you don’t (Dembroff 31).” Critically, in the case of double binds any action 
taken will reinforce oppressive social norms (Dembroff 31). In the case of gender based 
oppression of those excluded from the category of “real men,” one example of a double 
bind is found in the social policing of gay men’s affection. Here, there is a social norm 
that gay relationships are improper and should be kept behind closed doors. Gay men can 
either choose to comply with this standard that is not applied to heterosexual 
relationships thereby reinforcing the strength of the norm, or actively rebel against the 
norm and face social sanctions often in the form of violence (Dembroff 32).  
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Lastly, Dembroff defines “doubling down” as “the use of violence to punish men 
who are perceived as violating or otherwise threatening the prevailing ideals of manhood 
(Dembroff 5).” To use the above example, gay men are often subjected to violence given 
heterosexuality’s connection to patriarchal manhood. Similarly, this violent form of 
gender based oppression is also externalized onto transgender men. As is the case with 
gender broadly, the boundaries of “manhood” are enforced with violence to the detriment 
of those excluded from the category of “real men.” Clearly, in these cases, men can face 
gender based oppression for their failure to conform with the traditional notion of what it 
means to be a man.  
Importantly, Dembroff makes clear that they have no intention of establishing a 
definite hierarchy of oppression (Dembroff 7). Instead, their intention is to demonstrate 
that patriarchy situates a small group of “real men” in the dominant position (Dembroff 
36-37). Those excluded from the category of “real men” including but not limited to 
black, gay and transgender men, as well as women, all face gender based oppression. In 
this way, Dembroff challenges the idea of “unqualified male privilege” by showing that 
women are not the only victims of patriarchy (Dembroff 2). With this perspective, it is 
clear that gender abolition will also benefit men along with women.  
While most of Dembroff’s analysis focuses on the ways in which marginalized 
men face gender oppression, they also readily acknowledge that even those within the 
category of “real men” may be harmed by gender (Dembroff 7).  As Dembroff points out, 
just because “real men” occupy a “dominant” social position does not mean that their 
unchosen social role is conducive to a happy or fulfilling life (Dembroff 7). Dembroff 
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reminds us that “even (or especially) the most gender conforming men hugely suffer 




 In sum, while we often think of gender oppression in a simplistic, binary manner 
(benefiting all men and harming all women) the reality is much more nuanced. Although 
men are certainly advantaged by virtue of their gender relative to women in patriarchal 
society, this does not mean that gender actually benefits men in absolute terms. As I have 
shown this chapter, gender disadvantages men from an epistemic perspective. Given 
men’s dominant position within patriarchal society, men do readily develop some of the 
more complex understandings of social relationships that women must develop as a result 
of gender based oppression. This epistemic harm is evident in even the most well 
intentioned men’s lack of awareness regarding issues such as sexual violence. One 
consequence in these gaps in knowledge is that men develop with a flawed understanding 
of human nature. This includes a general lack of awareness of gender itself, which 
enables passive acceptance of sometimes fatal gender roles. Moreover, as Dembroff 
demonstrates in Putting Real Men on Top many men are, in fact, subject to gender based 
oppression. In reality, only a narrow segment of men fit within the category of “real 
men,” which has historically excluded men of color, gay men and transgender men. 
Clearly, gender is not even defensible from the perspective of those who it should 
theoretically advantage. Even from the perspective of a purely self interested man, gender 




CHAPTER 6: Abolition in practice 
 
Recall that in my previous chapter on gender abolition I argued that there were two 
principal avenues to abolition. Specifically, I argued that it is possible to move towards 
genderlessness by either eroding the delegative aspect of gender, or it’s linkage to 
biological sex. This two pronged approach offers a natural framework for this chapter. 
Here, I must point out that I do not intend on offering a comprehensive account that's full 
realization would result in the total abolition of gender. Rather, this chapter seeks to 
advance a few concrete examples of what gender abolition looks like in practice. In the 
first section of this chapter I examine some of the forms of gender that we find most 
natural and question the least. Critically, these are some of the most profound 
manifestations of gender. I will first focus on abolition of the delegative aspect of gender 
focusing on the establishment of parental roles and the promotion of women’s 
physicality. I will then shift to abolition of the linkage of biological sex assigned at birth 
and gender, focusing on transgender and intersex people and the issue of gendered 
bathrooms. 
 
DEGENDERING THE FAMILY 
 
Looking first at the abolition of the delegative aspect of gender, I begin my 
analysis by focusing on the category of mother and father in contrast to genderless 
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parental roles. As I have made clear in the preceding chapters, the structure of the 
traditionally gendered family carries rigid, well-defined, yet unquestioned, duties, 
expectations, and privileges. In the family, perhaps more so than in any other institution, 
gender roles are legitimized as a natural extension of the biological order, given the 
reproductive capabilities of women. I choose to start here because the assumed division 
of labor in the family that delegates greater domestic responsibility to women is 
foundational to the broader construction of gender within patriarchy, thus affecting 
virtually all women. In this way, the abolition of gendered parental roles would 
necessarily lead to fundamental changes in how our society conceives of what it means to 
be a man or woman more generally. In very much the same vein, many philosophers have 
held that the family as an institution is responsible for the moral development of children 
(Okin 95-97). Thus, within the traditionally gendered family young boys are learning to 
inhabit a dominant social position while young girls are taught that their subordination is 
natural. If you accept my argument to this point that gender is an injustice that stands in 
the way of human advancement, then it is evident that the traditionally gendered family is 
failing in one of its primary aims - the moral development of future generations. For this 
reason, focusing on gender abolition within the household is a logical starting point that 
will have profound effects on how gender manifests itself for future generations. 
 What would degendering the family look like? In her dissertation Recognizing 
Social Subjects: Gender, Disability and Social Standing, Filipa Melo Lopes states that 
“degendering foregrounds some of these other forms of social identification as alternative 
bases for social coordination (Melo Lopes 153-154).” While my conception of gender 
abolition offered in chapter two is different than Melo Lopes’, this statement is central to 
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my understanding of what degendering the family would entail. The concepts of 
“mother” and “father” mean much more than female parent and male parent within the 
traditionally gendered family. Instead, these categories delineate different normative 
conceptions of the proper distribution of labor and decision-making power within the 
family. For example, within the traditionally gendered family, the mother is expected to 
do a greater share of domestic labor while the father is assumed to be engaged in wage 
labor outside of the household as the primary breadwinner. Of course, there are plenty of 
cases where the family is not structured this way, just as there are gender-nonconforming 
individuals, but the point is that when the general public speaks of motherhood and 
fatherhood they have two separate but unequal concepts in mind.  
 With this background, we see that under Melo Lopes’ framework degendering the 
family involves the dissolution of the concepts of mother and father and instead requires 
the ‘foregrounding’ of parental responsibility. In accordance with Melo Lopes’ 
framework, social coordination around parenthood seeks to find commonality in social 
position rather than distinction, thereby reducing our reliance on gender (Melo Lopes 
154). Coordination around this concept would likely eschew differential responsibilities 
in child-rearing duties for a more even distribution of domestic labor. In this scenario, 
which parent is caring for the children at a particular moment would have more to do 
with their different availability both temporally and emotionally, as opposed to a 
normative notion of duty based on the parents’ biological sex. Moreover, as I have 
mentioned in previous chapters, implicit in gender is the notion of hierarchy, which is 
particularly pronounced within the family. Here, the necessity of substituting parenthood 
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for mother/fatherhood again aligns with Melo Lopes’ conception of gender reinvention as 
replacing hierarchal concepts with more egalitarian ones (Melo Lopes 155).  
However, as Melo Lopes points out, this task is much easier said than done 
considering the fact that gender’s often unquestioned legitimacy limits our ability to 
conceive of modes of social organization outside of the notion of gender (Melo Lopes 
155). In other words, Melo Lopes holds that “anything that looks like a gendered mode of 
social relations to us is going to encode hierarchy in some way or another (Melo Lopes 
154).” Despite the difficulty, this is a strong argument for the abolition of gender within 
the family. Even if what it means to be a mother in the 21st century is different than even 
50 years ago, this does not change the fact that motherhood still subordinates women 
within the traditionally gendered family. Therefore, if we value egalitarianism and resent 
hierarchy then the furthest advance of this end must be the abolition of gender. In order to 
create a more just familial structure, the concepts of mother and father must be abolished 
in favor of a parenthood that makes no distinction between men and women.  
What are some of the concrete steps a well intentioned couple could take to 
degender their relationship within the traditionally gendered family? At the most basic 
level, couples can try to model justice within the family for their kids by equally sharing 
in domestic responsibilities. Critically, the couple should also seek to make sure that 
there is not just an even distribution with regards to time, but that their responsibilities are 
not gendered. For example, from an abolitionist point of view it would be preferable for 
young children to see their mothers doing her fair share of traditionally masculine jobs 
like repairing the house, while the dad is also able to do more feminine jobs like cleaning. 
Additionally, it is crucial that the couple also share equally in decision making power 
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within the household. One main assumption of the traditionally gendered family is that 
the father holds the most power. In other words, the traditionally gendered family is 
patriarchal, so couples seeking to degender their household should be sure to challenge 
this norm.  
However, it is worth pointing out that gender’s force would likely endure even 
with a well-intentioned couple attempting to degender their familial relations. Beyond the 
imaginative limitations mentioned above, the couple would likely still be limited by their 
social circumstances. What I mean by this is even if the couple degenders their 
relationship as much as possible, we still live in a gendered world. With regards to child 
rearing, this difficulty is evidenced in the gendered structure of the workplace. To this 
day, many workplaces assume that each, presumably male, worker has a wife back home 
to take care of children. This allows the male worker to have children while 
simultaneously working hours that would not otherwise allow for them to be adequately 
cared for. Additionally, women’s professional commitment is often underestimated due 
to the gendered assumption that women will be less dedicated to their paid jobs, because 
of familial and caregiving responsibilities. With this in mind, it is clear that even if both 
parents intend on degendering their relationship, they are still constrained by the external 
world that assumes a gendered division of labor within the family. Importantly, this 
limitation will be felt more acutely by poor families that cannot pay for childcare while 
both parents work and families that have less job flexibility.  
In recognition of this fact, it is undeniable that governmental institutions have a 
major role to play in the abolition of gender. While Rawls may leave the family outside 
the scope of justice, and while this may fit with our intuitions of what overreach looks 
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like, we are confusing the issue. In reality the family does not exist within a bubble, 
instead, its form is actively shaped by institutional arrangements that exist outside of the 
household. In this way, the family is already within the scope of governmental reach, but 
how this happens is much less invasive then we act sometimes. If the family is already 
within the scope of governmental policy, we should create the most just policies. Here, 
through public policy, the government has the ability to promote greater freedom for 
everyone within the family, rather than trying to police what goes on within the family.  
For example, paid and enforced parental leave for both parents would help 
promote justice within the family. Presently, women are penalized in professional 
environments for the choice to have children in a way that men are not. The assumption 
that mothers will take maternity leave while men continue working is one factor 
contributing to the gender pay gap, and presents a major obstacle to women’s hiring and 
advancement within companies. This reality further legitimizes the patriarchal ordering 
of the traditionally gendered family by legitimizing the patriarchs domination through 
greater economic power. If men were forced to take paternity leave, there would be an 
immediate shift towards generalized parental roles as both parents would be present for 
the intense child rearing responsibilities associated with infants. Additionally, this would 
likely change power dynamics within the family by promoting women’s economic power 
over time. Another closely related policy would be accessible child care. As with 
enforced parental leave, accessible childcare would degender the family by making it 
easier for women to pursue their professional as well as personal interests and goals. 
Given that the imposition of domestic labor upon women is one of the main 
characteristics of gender, accessible child care would fundamentally alter our current 
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construction of gender. All of these policies located outside of the household have the 





To examine another aspect of gender where difference between men and women 
is assumed to be natural, consider physical activity. As Iris Marion Young describes in 
Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and 
Spatiality, refusing to acknowledge the differences between how men and women move 
and occupy space amounts to pretending to be blind to gender (Young 29). As Young 
argues, this difference that is often assumed to be biological and essential is instead a 
consequence of the enforcement of gender on all children (Young 30, 42). Of course, 
Young is careful to acknowledge that this observation is both a generalization with many 
outliers, and specific to our contemporary social context (Young 29). Yet, Young holds 
that this contextually situated generalization reveals a great deal about the nature of 
gender itself (Young 30).  
I am sure that we have all heard the phrase “throw/punch/run like a girl.” While 
this statement is often used to degenerate the subject, Young holds that the difference 
between men’s and women’s movement is observable in many cases (Young 28). Most 
generally, Young says that typically women and girls tend to not use the full range of 
motion of their body during physical activity (Young 32). Women and girls are also less 
likely to make full use of the space surrounding them, and thus exist within a more 
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constricted space (Young 32). These two observations are not limited to actions like 
throwing but are also noticeable in how women and girls walk, stand, sit and carry their 
belongings (Young 32). Moreover, women and girls are often more hesitant than men to 
use the full power of their body when faced with tasks that require physical exertion 
(Young 33). To give an example offered by Young, when lifting a heavy box women 
tend to not fully utilize their legs and instead rely on their arms too much (Young 33). 
Overall, Young holds women physically interact with the surrounding environment 
“timidity, uncertainty, and hesitance” rooted in a lack of belief in the capability of their 
bodies (Young 34). This then leads to “feelings of incapacity, frustration, and self-
consciousness (Young 34).” 
While typically this variation between men and women has been interpreted as 
biological, Young posits that a better explanation centers the way in which women are 
“conditioned by their sexist oppression in contemporary society (Young 34).” Examining 
this quote, I must point out that the social conditioning of women in an oppressive 
manner could be offered as a succinct definition of the patriarchal construction of gender, 
despite the fact that Young never once uses the word gender in her essay. To tie this 
statement back to my definition of gender, “conditioning” reflects the learned and 
enforced aspect of gender, while “sexist oppression” exhibits the hierarchical component 
of my framework. Moreover, the phrase “in contemporary society”  embodies the 
constructed, and context-dependent nature of gender. In other words, Young’s main 
thesis could be reformulated to state that the physical differences in men’s and women’s 
movement are a result of gender rather than biological sex. A strong piece of evidence in 
support of this conclusion is the fact that the gap between men and women with regards 
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to “motor skills, movement [and]  spatial perception” is a byproduct of age (Young 44). 
Until elementary school, boys and girls are indistinguishable in this respect, with the gap 
widening until adulthood (Young 44). This suggests that this difference is learned as 
children grow older, as we would expect if gender was the cause rather than biology. 
Young argues that gender “physically handicaps” women by delegating and 
enforcing a social position in which they are “physically inhibited, confined, positioned, 
and objectified (Young 42-43).” Partially, this is a result of the fact that young girls are 
not encouraged to develop these capacities in the same way boys are (Young 43). Instead, 
women are taught to be fearfully cautious to avoid injury and maintain their femininity 
(Young 44). Simultaneously, Young contends that women’s existence within a culture of 
objectification also effects body movement and posture in a unique way. Specifically, one 
explanation for women’s relatively closed, confined posture and movement is that more 
“outwarddirectedness” would be to “invite objectification (Young 44).” Beyond the 
degradation inherent in objectification, this also represents a very tangible safety concern 
given the prevalence of sexual violence perpetrated by men against women (Young 44).  
Why are the gendered differences in movement and spatial positioning 
significant? I hold that these differences between men and women are linked to deeper 
and more pernicious characteristics of gender. For example, gender teaches women to 
doubt their physical capabilities (Young 34). Because the cultivation of these capacities is 
not encouraged, women internalize a notion of their fragility that leads to decreased 
confidence and greater timidity (Young 34). Critically, the notion that women are more 
fragile than men has served to legitimize current gender roles in a significant way. A 
major component of the patriarchal conception of gender is the idea of the man as the 
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protector of the woman. One need look no further than any fairy tale that centers on a 
knight coming to the rescue of a woman in distress to see the cultural significance that 
this gendered trope holds. Indeed, we are fed this social script again and again through 
television, film  Implicit here is the notion that women are in need of protection and are 
incapable of fending for themselves. This is then used to justify the control of women by 
men. With this in mind, it is clear that the way women are conditioned to think about 
their movement and physical capabilities serves to further their own oppression by 
legitimizing a form of gender that disguises oppressive control as beneficent protection.  
This dynamic is seen clearly in Young’s example centering on the responses of 
young boys and girls questioned about risks (Young 43). Both genders believed that 
“girls are more likely to get hurt than boys are, and that girls ought to remain close to 
home, while boys can roam and explore (Young 43-44).” These statements are 
particularly shocking given the way in which it parallels more complex adult 
relationships, despite the fact that the respondents are only children. It is not hard to see 
how “ought to remain close to home,” could be rearticulated 15 years down the line as 
“forego professional opportunities in favor of raising a child” or “should not be overly 
ambitious” or any other deeply gendered statement. Here, we see that notions of 
differential physical capability can be quickly translated into much deeper prescriptive 
norms that ultimately reinforce gender.  
With this in mind, we see that the difference in movement between men and 
women conditioned by gender is linked to concepts such as confidence, self image and 
perceived social positionality. In this way, there exists a feedback loop whereby women 
are conditioned by gender to doubt their physical abilities, which then reinforce gender. 
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Young also embraces a more expansive view of the implications of these observations of 
gendered physical movement and spatial relation stating, “I have an intuition that the 
general lack of confidence that [women] frequently have about our cognitive or 
leadership abilities is traceable in part to an original doubt of our body’s capacity (Young 
45).” Though she is cautious to make definite claims given that there is a lack of 
empirical evidence as this topic is relatively understudied.  
What is the relevance of this example in the context of gender abolition? If gender 
and attached concepts like self image are really linked to movement in a reciprocally 
causal way, then our analysis thus far has revealed a very concrete avenue towards the 
abolition of gender. Though it may seem mundane in comparison to the term abolition 
intself, one significant way of dismantling gender is by challenging the gendered 
difference in movement. Empowering women physically has the consequence of 
undermining the notion that women are fragile or helpless. As I just mentioned, this 
notion is intimately linked to one prominent legitimizing myth of gender that women 
need to be protected and therefore controlled by men. This myth is directly tied to the 
subjugation of women insofar as the hierarchical structure of gender is a byproduct of this 
assumed “biological” difference.  In this way, overcoming the gendered difference in 
movement is an act of abolition. The empowerment of women physically necessarily 
weakens the legitimizing myth of women’s helplessness, and therefore erodes the force 
of gender itself in a not insignificant way.  
 What does this look like in practice? To offer some thoughts on raising a 
daughter, it is important that parents pay attention to the gendered dimensions of how 
their children play. While parents should certainly always have the health of their child at 
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the forefront of their mind, parents must also critically examine whether or not they are 
encouraging their daughter to be careful in a distinct way from their son. As Young 
describes, this creates within children a gendered idea that women should take fewer risks 
and remain closer to home than boys who should be afforded greater freedom.  Moreover, 
parents should avoid giving heavily gendered toys. While boys and girls alike may love 
stuffed animals and dolls, it is important that young girls also be given the opportunities 
for athletic achievement that are often forced upon young boys. Athleticism for boys is 
held as a virtue in a way that it is not for girls thus laying the groundwork for the 
gendered difference in movement described by Young. By encouraging children to play 
in a less gendered way, we enable kids to grow in a way that is less subject to gender.  
From the perspective of a benign planner, it is apparent that a crucial component 
of gender abolition should be to encourage women to express their power physically. 
This could take the form of investing in and promoting women’s sports. Critically, in 
order to be most effective this must occur from an early age, so that young girls are able 
to reap the benefits to confidence and self esteem that come with increased belief in 
bodily power. However, this is not to minimize the importance of professional athletics 
for women. Because women’s sports are so undervalued relative to men’s from both a 
monetary and social standpoint, there is less incentive for young girls to competitively 
participate in athletics relative to young boys. Here, I must point out that men’s 
willingness to make jokes to demean women’s sports is quite pernicious. These jokes 
serve to reinforce patriarchy by instilling a sense of physical inferiority in women, and 
reinforce gender by relying on essentialist notions of men and women’s differential 
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capabilities. With this in mind, it is crucial that abolitionists vocally identify these types 
of digs as the misogyny that they are.  
While advocates for equity between women and men’s sports may not realize it, 
by enabling women to develop their physical power they are actively engaged in the 
process of deconstructing gender. First of all, women’s sports directly undermines the 
gendered notion that women are physically fragile. As I mentioned above, this 
legitimizing myth of fragility is intimately connected with gender hierarchy. 
Additionally, physical differences between men and women’s movement is often pointed 
to as evidence of the essentialist differences between men and women. In this way, 
working to undermine the social basis for the gendered difference in movement would 
over time weaken the broader notion that men and women’s differential position within 
society is a natural consequence of our biologies. Clearly, one fruitful yet simple path 
towards gender abolition is to promote women’s physicality through sport.  
 
ABOLITION OF THE LINKAGE ASPECT 
 
 As I mentioned in my chapter on gender abolition, transgender people’s very 
existence challenges the restrictive construction of gender that exists under patriarchy. As 
I have stated, my definition of gender is an operative definition rather than a normative 
one. In other words, the fact that transgender people are marginalized by this definition, 
in the sense that their gender identity is seperate from their biological sex assigned at 
birth which is a constitutive element of gender, is a reflection of the very real alienation 
that transgender people experience within patriarchal society. By choosing their gender 
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identity, rather than accepting the assignment based on linkage as cisgender people do, 
transgender people push against the boundaries of gender in a meaningful way and are 
exposed to severe violence as a consequence.  
In this way, all transgender people are engaged in a revolutionary, abolitionist act 
that fundamentally challenges the dominant gender ideology. Through living their truth, 
transgender people pave the road for those in the future who wish to rebel against the 
injustice that is gender. Critically, the beneficiaries of transgender individual’s 
trailblazing are not only other transgender individuals. Virtually all humans would benefit 
from the erosion of the linkage between biological sex and gender. If this linkage and 
subsequent involuntary assignment at birth is abolished, then people would be truly free 
to choose to live in whatever way they see fit for themselves.  
Surely, social roles would persist, but by detaching these roles from an unchosen 
characteristic like sex humans would begin to be able to enter into these roles 
consensually without coercion. This would certainly result in a radical change to 
whatever remaining gender roles that there would be. Because gender today is coercive, it 
is possible to maintain a deeply oppressive hierarchical system. However, if people were 
able to freely choose their gender role then it is likely that over time the category of 
“woman” would be characterized by subjugation to a lesser extent, as people would 
theoretically reject an unequivocally harmful social role. Even if the resulting social roles 
did have some component of dominant vs submissive behavior, this would no longer 




With this in mind, it is apparent that one of the most direct ways to promote the 
abolition of gender is through the promotion of transgender people’s rights. Clearly, the 
plight of transgender people is intimately connected to that of those who suffer any form 
of gender oppression. In recognition of this deep connection, gender abolitionists should 
seek to increase the visibility and social acceptance of transgender people. While this 
certainly requires greater media exposure and education for the general population, 
gender abolitionists may find their interest are best served by directing their attention to 
parents. In recognition of the millions of transgender individuals whose gender identity 
does not align with their sex assigned at birth, abolitionists should advocate that parents 
should avoid gendering their child at birth. Clearly, this process of gendering is often 
wrong; a mistake that imposes significant costs on the child through their development. If 
parents ceased to gender their kids in such a rigid way, then the process of transitioning 
would likely be far less tumultuous as transitioning individuals would be making a much 
less radical change. This increasingly genderless world would also likely result in a 
decrease in violence against transgender indviduals. 
This example is extremely interesting as it exemplifes the reciprocal nature of 
transgender liberation and gender liberation generally. It is as if there is a feedback loop, 
whereby degendering in a general way advances the wellbeing of transgender individuals, 
while at the very same time actions that uplift transgender people also promote 
degendering. For example, on the surface, the practice of displaying personal pronouns, a 
key component of transgender inclusivity, may seem to reinforce gender. However, in 
reality displaying pronouns is an act that is undertaken in recognition of the idea that 
individuals should be free to choose their gender identity. Clearly, this is a direct 
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challenge to the linkage of biological sex and gender. As the two previous examples 
show, transgender liberation and full gender abolition are inseperably connected.  
Another method for weakening the linkage of biological sex and gender is 
through the creation of social conditions and institutions that do not force people to police 
the boundaries of gender. For example, in her dissertation Filipa Melo Lopes argues that 
one important site of gender contestation is bathrooms (Melo Lopes 157). Melo Lopes 
argues that instead of attempting to fix the inherent logical tension at the heart of gender 
and equality, we should instead attempt to create a less gendered world (Melo Lopes 
157). In the context of gendered restrooms, Melo Lopes argues that “when a security 
guard, or even another user, finds themselves in the position to police segregation, they 
have to think quite consciously about what men and women are like (Melo Lopes 157).” 
In this way, the gendered design of restrooms strengthens the social enforcement 
mechanism linking biological sex and gender by bringing to the forefront the question of 
who fits within the categories of man and woman.  
By placing individuals into positions to police the boundaries of gender, people 
are encouraged to make judgement calls about others’ sex regardless of their gender 
presentation, and more explicitly their inborn genetalia. Melo Lopes argues that one 
common but flawed approach to the issue of gendered bathrooms is “to educate and train 
employees and bathroom users about the nuances of masculinity, femininity, the need to 
respect transgender people, or masculine women (Melo Lopes 158).” However, this 
approach is still problematic in that it still relies on individuals’ enforcement of gender 
boundaries merely in a more benign way. These types of reforms continue to legitimize 
gender in a way that naturalizes an inherently unjust social construction. Just because 
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restrooms may be policed in a more inclusive manner does not change the fact that 
bathrooms will continue to act as a site that links gender and exclusivity in the minds of 
every participant. With this in mind, Melo Lopes suggests that a superior approach would 
be to degender bathrooms in a way such that no one is put into a position to monitor the 
actions of others (Melo Lopes 158). This type of reimagining would have the effect of 
removing the “centrality of gender to certain social contexts (Melo Lopes 158).” In Melo 




 As I have argued, there are two primary ways to approach gender abolition - 
through deconstructing the delegative aspect of gender or by eroding gender’s linkage 
with biological sex. First, I examined the abolition of the delegative aspect of gender, 
offering two examples of features of gender that are thought to be most natural. Looking 
first at the gendered social categories of motherhood and fatherhood, I held that abolition 
in this context would require eschewing these two social roles for the gender neutral 
concept of parenthood. Critically, while I offered some suggestions for parents seeking to 
degender their family dynamics, I also highlighted the central role that governments’ 
have in facilitating gender abolition in this context. While many philosophers have held 
that the family is beyond the scope of justice, my analysis suggests that in order to create 
a world with gender justice, it is necessary that the government attend to the institutional 
consequences of the patriarchal construction of gender. In this way, policies such as 
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enforced paternity leave and accessible child care are central to the broader mission of 
gender abolition. 
 I also put forward the gendered differences in movement as an example of gender 
that is often taken to be natural. However, I demonstrated that this phenomenon is a 
byproduct of the patriarchal construction of gender that serves to legitimize male 
domination. In this way, the perception of physical difference in men and women creates 
a feedback loop that deepens this differential and then uses this to legitimize the unjust 
delegation of social goods such as self determination and power. With this background, I 
hold that one seemingly mundane but profound path towards weakening the delegative 
aspect of gender is to encourage women’s motility in the same way as is the case with 
men. Therefore, promoting women’s physicality is an important avenue towards gender 
abolition.  
 Additionally, gender abolition can occur through the weakening of the linkage 
between biological sex and gender. As I have discussed in previous chapters, perhaps the 
most visible example of this process of abolition in this context is the brave, 
revolutionary action of trangender people who eschew their assigned gender in favor of 
self determination. Here, the brutal force of gender is readily apparent in the amount of 
violence faced by transgender individuals for their deviation from what is socially 
acceptable. In this way, the struggles of gender abolitionists and transgender individuals 
are inextricably linked with each groups activism overlapping and serving the same ends. 
With this in mind, it is apparent that gender abolitionists should focus on promoting 
transgender peoples rights. I also put forward the idea that gender abolition requires the 
creation of a world that does not police the boundaries of gender through, for example, 
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the existence of transgender restrooms. These both represent important ways that gender 
abolitionists can seek to undermine the linkage of biological sex and unchosen social 
























SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
 To briefly take stock of my overall argument put forward in this thesis,  I began 
by offering an operational definition of gender. My definition, which focused on gender 
as the basis for the distribution of social expectations and it’s linkage with biological sex, 
was intended to reflect gender’s restrictive and hierarchical nature. I then clarified 
precisely what I meant by abolition. In short, my view of abolition is the full realization 
of genderlessness. We move towards genderlessness through abolitionist acts that weaken 
either the delegative aspect of gender or the force of gender’s connection with biological 
sex.  
 I then put forward two contrasting theories of human advancement and showed 
that both imply gender abolition. First, I looked at Marx’s ideas regarding human 
emancipation and the abolition of the division of labor broadly. Human emancipation 
requires the dissolution of social constructs that create antagonisms between humans that 
prevent our flourishing. I argued that gender is exactly this type of social construct, and 
thus human emancipation requires the dissolution of gender. Similarly, Marx calls for the 
abolition of the division of labor, so given that gender has been constructed upon the 
division of labor here we again see that gender abolition is implied. In contrast to the 
Marxist perspective explored in chapter three, chapter four focused on Amartya Sen’s 
Development as Freedom. Sen’s vision of human development mandates for the removal 
of sources of unfreedom, and as I established in this chapter gender is certainly one of the 
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most profound sources of unfreedom that we often leave unchallenged. With this in mind, 
Sen’s vision of human development taken to the furthest extent would necessarily have 
an element of gender abolition.  
 In chapter five, I transitioned slightly arguing that gender not only harms women, 
but also men. Drawing upon Briana Toole’s work on standpoint epistemology, I posited 
that from an epistemic perspective gender constitutes a harm for men. Gender hinders 
men’s ability to accurately understand themselves, the world, and their position within it. 
Critically, these epistemic harms also lead to negative physiological and emotional 
outcomes such as high rates of mortality from heart disease driven by the stress of their 
unchosen social roles. Additionally, I draw upon the work of Robin Dembroff who 
argues that gender oppression is more complex than a binary view that asserts that all 
men benefit from patriarchy. Instead, they argue that patriarchy is built around the 
exclusive notion of the category of “real men.” In this way, men that are excluded from 
this category, for example black men or gay men, can face gender based violence by 
virtue of their maleness. These two arguments are intended to show that gender abolition 
will not only benefit women. Instead, gender abolition will improve the condition of all 
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